


Testimonies of Resistance In Jenin Camp

2002



Prepared and Edited
By Walid Daqqa



Testimonies of Resistance
The Battel for Jenin Camp 2002

Waleed Duqa

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تصميم وتنفيذ مؤسسة نأكيا للطباعة والنشر والإعلان والتوزيع
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ما يرد في هذا الكتاب من آراء وأفكار يعبر عن وجهة نظر المؤلف ولا يعكس
بالضرورة موقف مواطن - المؤسسة الفلسطينية لدراسة الديمقراطية

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Foreword

This is a unique book, a book captured by one of the veteran prisoners in the occupation's prisons from the mouths of his new comrades, fighters in the battle of Jenin Camp, who were captured after they fought for the camp until the last bullet. It is therefore a vivid and authentic document that narrates the events day by day, in detail, and from all angles: the military engagement, the enemy's tactics, the resistance's tactics, the weapons used, the relationship with the camp's residents, the relationship with the media, and everything in between.

The veteran prisoner, Walid Daqqa, was able to obtain the experience before it dried up and was forgotten. He believed it should be collected now, not tomorrow, because tomorrow will certainly influence the way the experience is narrated and its facts, no matter how fair and just we are.

For this reason, the book is truly foundational, meaning that it gives us the raw material that enables us to seriously consider the battle of Jenin Camp and draw lessons from it. I must say that these are not local lessons, meaning that they do not pertain to the Palestinian situation alone, but rather general lessons related to the possibility of urban warfare and population centers in the new century, the 21st century. And if this great battle was about to be forgotten after America's war on Iraq, in which cities fell like cardboard awnings, this book comes to restore its spirit, declaring that the will of the people to resist is the foundation.

Using IEDs, Jenin Camp held out with incredible resilience, opening the door to rebuilding the legend of an invincible, resistant population center.

It is true that the small camp was eventually crushed, but not before it had delivered the message: that the legends of Stalingrad, Beirut, and others could be revived, if the will to fight and persevere was present and existed.

It was unfortunate for Jenin Camp that the fall of Baghdad came just weeks after its battle had ended. Its message seemed out of step with the times, and unrealistic. But this was simply bad luck. The will of the people to persevere, the spirit of resistance, is what ultimately decides. This is what the camp proved. This is what Baghdad proved, in reverse, regardless of the circumstances, which everyone is aware of.

Therefore, carrying and disseminating the message of resistance from this camp is essential in order to restore the spirit of resistance throughout the Arab region during the period of the new occupation. It is a national and pan-Arab mission, to say the least.

This book is an attempt in this direction. In this sense, it is not a book, but an explosive device against the spirit of defeat and capitulation throughout the Arab world.

I read this book with complete enjoyment and amazement, an enjoyment stemming from the meticulous and fascinating interview conducted by the fighter Walid Daqqa and his fellow fighters from Jenin Camp, and amazement that we knew so little about the great battle for Jenin Camp.

It is not yet time to write a complete and detailed history of this battle, but without this book it would not have been possible for us to begin this task, after laying the foundation for us to carry it out. As for those who are exhausted by successive defeats, the day will come when they realize the importance of the Battle of Jenin Camp, which placed ordinary fighters like Abu Jandal and his comrades, who were not trained in military colleges, on an equal footing with people who deserve to be mentioned in world military history.

And in the Palestinian street, which was stunned by the rapid fall of Baghdad, people would remember, whenever waves of despair attacked them, "Jenin Camp." Their inner voice would say, "We held out there with rifles and IEDs, and we are proud of that." Thus, "Jenin Camp" helped them to hold out and to continue the confrontation. There is no greater mission than this one.

Finally, we note that the owners of these testimonies have reviewed them after they were printed and have given written consent to their publication, and that the information contained therein is known to the Israeli authorities, and that any unknown information was not included in the testimonies.

Zakaria Mohammad

Editor of the Palestinian Experience series

Introduction

The surviving resistance fighters in Jenin Camp offer their testimony as a resource for researchers and a written account for the benefit of activists. They are speaking for the first time so that layers of myth do not accumulate over the experience from one memory to the next, and to liberate the experience from those who have confiscated it by singing its praises and opposing it in reality, and from those who have reduced it to a mere slogan, material that has never been published before. Much has been written about what happened in Jenin, but no one has asked the resistance fighters. Their fellow prisoner, the activist and intellectual Walid Daqqa, who has been serving a life sentence in prison for 17 years, did just that.

There is a distance we maintain when we write between the event - the issue and us, a distance of time, place, and even psychological state, and thus there is also a distance between what we write and what we write about. We cannot write about death, hunger, or fear while experiencing these states at the same moment. No matter how honest our writing is and how it interacts with the event - the state, it cannot be the state. No one writes with ink from their intestines about hunger, and no one writes with blood about killing and death. Do not believe these exaggerations, for they are nothing but rhetorical attempts to get closer in our writing to the state or as close to it as possible. But you will never go hungry when you read about hunger, and you will never die or be afraid when you read about fear.

If that were the case, you would not read unless you were masochists, and as long as you read voraciously or for pleasure, you are at most sadists.

Writing about detention - imprisonment as a state of loss of freedom differs in this sense from death, fear, or hunger. You can write about your stolen freedom and the experience of captivity while in captivity, to live the moment and describe it together. In the state of loss of freedom, it affirms to me that freedom is less essential than the physical existence of a person who is threatened by death or hunger. The saying that man does not live on bread alone conflicts with the saying that there is no Torah without flour. When it is possible to write about the loss of freedom at the moment of its loss, it means that the writing will be more accurate and closer to the image of reality. The ability to write about the loss of freedom at the moment of its loss is possible because writing is a state of infiltration outside prison walls and a means of escape for consciousness outside its cells, even at the moment of writing about cells. In this sense, to write and to live the state becomes freedom or its loss, conscious, mental, or intellectual states practiced through writing or talking about it, separate from the physical state of the imprisoned body isolated from the outside world. The loss of freedom or its availability is not a legal state. According to my legal status, I am a prisoner who cannot reach my bed except by opening eight doors.

These doors have been closed for 17 years, and I have continued to reject them and reject the consequences of my classification as a prisoner. This is not a case of

separation from reality, but rather a rejection of it as if it were fate. A rejection built and founded on the conviction that it is reality, but it is not reality. It is a life that I live, but it is not life. Throughout the years of captivity, I have tried to expand the scope of my freedom, and the means of expanding the scope of freedom are many. Reading is a transition to a world other than the world of prison. Television is an important means, but it is a cheap, quick means that disrupts the natural human imagination. You do not need more than a push of a button on the controller and a pair of eyes with which to follow the screen. Escaping outside the walls through the natural human imagination requires mental abilities and a special and enjoyable brain game. You, unlike television, are the one who chooses the scene and its developments. You choose it according to your need and desire.

The novel comes between television and the free imagination in the novel. It takes the form of an initial scene, but you develop it and add to it whatever you want and however you want. Freedom in this sense is not imagination or fantasy, but rather a cerebral reality that you decide and take one step further if you wish.

Writing is the first step in transforming imagined freedom into reality. In the beginning, there are letters and words, then ideas and practical steps. Freedom, in any case, is not a mental state, as Ahmed Shawqi said, "Be beautiful and you will see existence as beautiful." But at the same time, it is not governed by material reality. It may be the human condition, with its mercurial or gaseous nature, evasive, and sneaky. How many are those who live outside the walls, their freedom evading and slipping away from them, living in tightly controlled prisons.

I am the prisoner Walid Nimr Daqqa, a Palestinian citizen of Israel - 48 years old, born in Baqa Al-Gharbiya in 1961. In the early 1980s, I and a group of young men from the [occupied] interior joined the ranks of one of the factions of the Palestinian revolution (the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine). We were organized into a military group of seven members, three of whom were from the villages of Al-Jalil, and four from the Triangle region. In 1984, three members of the group were selected to conduct military and security training, so that they would later form and monitor a military apparatus operating inside Israel. This apparatus was headed by the martyr comrade Ibrahim Al-Ra'i, a resident of the city of Qalqilya, who was arrested and physically eliminated in the cells of Ramla prison. The prison administration claimed that he committed suicide. I was one of the three who were chosen, and it was decided to deport us secretly with forged passports to Syria after we had traveled to different European countries as a temporary stop to receive our papers and new identity. Indeed, the necessary training was conducted for us in one of the camps affiliated with the Popular Front in Syria, near the Jordanian border, where the training lasted for about a month, during which I received various training on light weapons and explosives, in addition to a theoretical course on how to collect information.

There I met the official in charge of the Occupied Territories branch at the time, Abu Nidal, who made it clear from his speech that our mission as a military apparatus could be summed up in three points:

The first was to gather information about Israeli leaders and officials involved in the events in Lebanon in general and the Sabra and Shatila massacre in particular. The second was to carry out military operations to eliminate these officials, and the third was to abduct soldiers in order to exchange them for Palestinian and Arab prisoners held in Israeli prisons. I worked with members of the apparatus for about two years until I was arrested in 1986 on charges of abducting and killing an Israeli soldier and sentenced to life imprisonment, where I have spent 17 years to date.

The devastation caused by the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, particularly the Sabra and Shatila massacre, had a profound impact on me and many young Palestinians inside the so-called Green Line. This atmosphere prompted us to join the Palestinian resistance factions in an attempt to resolve the contradiction experienced by Arab citizens in Israel, a contradiction our generation experienced intensely due to the traumas wrought by the war. I believe this contradiction is also experienced intensely by young people today in light of the war crimes committed by the occupation against the Palestinian people in the occupied territories. The contradiction that was and still is between our belonging to the Palestinian people and carrying the Arab national identity with its concerns and dreams, with its hopes and pains, and our carrying Israeli citizenship that legally allows us to remain in our homeland, on our land, and as citizens of a state that defines itself as the state of the Jews. In the face of this contradiction, we decided at the time in favor of our Palestinian and Arab identity by joining the resistance factions at a time when we were lacking any political, theoretical, or even legal character that would enable us to tame the contradiction through struggle between our national, nationalist affiliation, and our citizenship. However, this decision of ours, which may be a possible individual solution, is not a solution for an entire people and not a solution for the 1,200,000 Arab citizens of Israel. Matters became mixed up for us and we did not know how to deal with the concepts of citizenship and nationalism, and no Arab party or political force provided us with an understanding or framework that would allow us sufficient space for struggle through which we could preserve our national identity and exercise our national duty on the one hand... and on the other hand, to maintain our existence, to be rooted in our land, and to seriously demand our full citizenship.

We believed, as the theories of the Arab and Jewish forces and parties tried to convince us, that we must choose between citizenship and national identity. Today, however, we believe that choosing one option by eliminating the other, in our circumstances as a national minority and in light of a political and legal reality with a complex character, means that we lose both options. What is the meaning of citizenship at the expense of national identity? It means a fragmented citizenship, an incomplete citizenship that begs for rights and does not get the crumbs of it, and it also means Israelization. What does it mean to make a choice, as we did in our case, in favor of joining one of the PLO factions? It means losing citizenship, and losing citizenship in our case as Arabs in Israel

means asylum and losing the homeland. It even means providing the theoretical climate and justifications for transfer, further confiscation of our rights as the original owners of the land. This, as I said, may be useful to resolve the state of contradiction among individuals, but it cannot be a struggle project for the Arab national minority in Israel, especially after the Oslo Accords skipped over this sector of the Palestinian people, and even skipped over us who joined the ranks of the Palestinian resistance, as the issue of our release, like all the other fighters, was considered within the framework of the Oslo Accords, a matter that has nothing to do with the Palestinian negotiator, but rather it is an internal Israeli affair.

After the signing of the Oslo Accords and the emergence of the National Democratic Assembly Party as a democratic Arab nationalist party with an intellectual and political project at the heart of the complex reality of the Palestinians inside Israel, I and a number of prisoners joined its ranks after this party developed a political ideology with its organizing slogan - a state for all its citizens - and expanded the scope of national democratic political struggle for us, for the Arabs inside Israel, and for the younger generations without the need to compromise our national and ethnic identity, or to risk or threaten our citizenship. The Rally Party, with its political thought, has given us a deeper understanding of nationalism and citizenship, as there is no separation between the two parts of this equation: national identity and full citizenship. It has opened the door to struggle against Zionism in its own home, revealing its historical crisis and the depth of the contradiction between the Jewishness of the state and its democracy at a time when many doors of struggle are closed to Palestinian and Arab youth. My affiliation with the Rally [Party] was not an affiliation to a program and project in which there is stagnation, escape, and laziness, but rather an affiliation in which there is struggle and work that goes beyond the issues of the Arab national minority in Israel, and in which there is more attachment and more belonging to our Palestinian Arab people and their national issues and demands.

I did not have the opportunity to study at university, as I joined the labor market immediately after completing high school in 1979, where I worked in construction sites, restaurants, and hotels in Tel Aviv. The years of detention provided me with the opportunity for self-study, and even a rare practical experience to participate in what I believe is the most difficult and arduous fronts of resistance, where, in light of the widespread arrests during the first Palestinian Intifada, it was required to reorganize and rearrange the ranks of this Palestinian army, which had reached more than 13,000 detainees. It was an opportunity to transfer what I had acquired in terms of study and theoretical understanding by imparting to these young people what I had acquired from the first generation of prisoners who had spent long years in captivity, such as the martyr Omar Al-Qasim, who died in prison after spending nearly 20 years due to a terminal illness. For me, joining the Open University of Tel Aviv, where I obtained a bachelor's degree in political science, and I am now working on completing my studies for a master's degree in topics related to democracy, was an attempt to develop the tools of struggle alongside practical and daily experience, and even alongside the necessity of preserving oneself from psychological and moral erosion as a result of the

long years of imprisonment taking every day away from me, and I try to compensate by studying and communicating with our people from inside the cells. The most dangerous thing that the national prisoner movement may face is that its members become focused only on their personal concerns, living the ordeal of captivity and deprivation of freedom, and becoming like patients focused on their illness and complaints instead of focusing on the reality of their people, their concerns, and issues. In this case, the fighters turn into a concern instead of being bearers of the national concern, and into an empty quantity instead of representing the elite of the struggle and resistance. With this understanding, I addressed my companion and friend Dr. Azmi Bishara about the necessity of documenting the experience of the valiant Palestinian Intifada and resistance in Jenin Camp. He devoted his time, effort, and relationships to conveying the voices of these fighters, and provided everything necessary to publish their narrative in a manner befitting the sacrifices of the martyrs and wounded so that the Arab citizen can see it from its primary source. Publishing the narrative of the Palestinian resistance in the Jenin Camp and in the voices of the resistance fighters themselves prevents it from being distorted or exploited by those who disavowed it in the heat of battle. Today, you hear some of these voices sometimes defaming the resistance and other times exploiting it for their own benefit, while the resistance is innocent of either of these two things. Moreover, publishing this narrative defends the idea of resistance and consequently the morale of the resistance fighters in light of the fierce incitement campaign that was launched after September 11th, aiming to characterize the Palestinian national struggle as terrorism.

Israel, which demolishes hundreds of homes, uproots trees, kills, displaces, and arrests thousands of prisoners, is doing so on a scale that exceeds, according to the understanding and mentality of its generals, its actual security needs. However, it is fully aware that the battle is not military, but rather a battle over the morale that protects the resistance as an idea... and the resistance fighters, as the bearers of this idea and who constitute a moral challenge, Israel wants to burden them with personal concerns and wounds that it creates for their families. Indeed, the prison administration, along with its Minister of Internal Security, has recently been trying to tighten the noose on the prisoner movement to make the lives of the prisoners an unbearable hell so that, as I mentioned, it is not possible for the fighters to communicate with their people about their issues and concerns. Israel has exhausted all its military plans, but its generals realize that the morale of the Palestinian people is still high and defies military charges. Therefore, the morale of the prisoners, as the solid nucleus of the resistance, is primarily targeted. Publishing the narrative of the resistance prisoners in Jenin Camp and continuing communication with their people and their Arab nation will not only strengthen their steadfastness and preserve the memory of the struggle, but will also preserve the freedom fighters as a national and moral value.

We believe these testimonies will certainly provide the researcher and historian with important material through which they will be able to objectively criticize the course of the resistance and Intifada, and reveal its weaknesses and strengths. The reader will also discover to what extent this people and this resistance possess the readiness for sacrifice, giving, and unparalleled courage. As much as his pride and honor increases in front of this picture, the Arab person will increase their questioning: How long will this national and human wound continue to bleed? And why does the just Palestinian cause not triumph despite all these sacrifices?

Walid Daqqa

Testimony of Hajj Ali Al-Safouri

Ali Suleiman Al-Saadi, or as he was known in the circles of the freedom fighters during the battles of the siege of Jenin Camp, Hajj Ali Al-Safouri, named after his hometown of Safouriya. His family was forced to leave in 1948 and settled as refugees in Jenin Camp. Hajj Ali was one of the prominent leaders in the camp confrontations and one of the 27 freedom fighters who were besieged in one of its homes, and then captured after the Israeli army's bulldozers, planes, and tanks destroyed most of the homes and neighborhoods of Jenin Camp.

Hajj Ali, how would you like me to address you? Ali Al-Saadi, Ali Al-Safouri, or Hajj "Mortar"?

Honestly, I am proud of all the names because they are names of honor and glory, and every name is a source of pride for me. Of course, "Hajj" is because I performed Hajj, praise be to Allah, Lord of the Worlds. My real name is Ali Suleiman Saeed Al-Saadi, from the Al-Saadi family. The nickname "Safouri" is because I am originally from Safouriya. Hajj "Mortar", this name was given to me because I was the first to make a "mortar" in the north and it was used to attack the "Gedim" settlement, and it was indeed a success. On this basis, I was given the name Hajj "Mortar."

Have you had military training...or do you have military qualifications?

In truth, I was not trained in any military college. I trained based on the reality I lived in, because the reality I live in is one of occupation, injustice, and oppression, which made me an instinctive fighter. Since the early '70s, when I first woke up to life, I started out with stones, and my fighting spirit developed because the occupation was still present, until we started firing mortars. In general, I didn't receive military training, and I am, in fact, a door and window blacksmith, and this is my main profession.

Have you been arrested in the past?

Yes, I was arrested previously in 1976 for a year, and then of course I was released in 1977. I returned to prison in 1978 and was released again in 1983. I was imprisoned in Jenin Prison, and then I was transferred to Nablus Central Prison. I served my sentence in Nablus Central Prison and was released from there.

I think you were a member of Fatah, weren't you?

Yes, I was in Fatah, and my first arrest was due to throwing stones, demonstrations, and raising flags. I was arrested during one of the demonstrations, and I spent a year there. After that, I was arrested for possessing explosive devices. After my release, I continued my life regularly and normally until the Oslo Accords came, hoping that they would achieve something for the Palestinian people. Unfortunately, they did not achieve

anything for them, and as you know, our people rose up, detonating a new Intifada. Of course, every free and honorable person who sees their people being humiliated, beaten, and destroyed should stand by their people and resist, even if only by a small part. Praise be to Allah, Lord of the Worlds, for His favor and blessings upon us, and we completed our journey with what our Lord had decreed for us.

Tell us when you began preparing to confront the Israeli army's siege of the camp, whether during the last invasion or before the invasion. What were the forces involved and what was the number of fighters?

In truth, this wasn't the only invasion we faced. You might be surprised that this small number of fighters faced these military vehicles in six invasions. We made mistakes in each invasion, however. But after each invasion, we, the persecuted youth who were primarily in charge of the camp, would sit down and evaluate the experience we had gone through, pointing out to ourselves the mistakes or shortcomings we had made so we could avoid them the next time.

Were all factions involved in the evaluation, or just your faction?

We in the camp abolished the factions... We did not abolish them completely, but rather there was national unity inside the camp. Every organization continued to carry out martyrdom operations and military operations outside the camp as it wanted... and it was free in this regard and was not restricted to us inside the camp... The national unity inside the camp was to defend the camp... There were the fighting brothers and the officials who supported each other to manufacture explosive devices, and we also brought vehicles to dig streets for us in order to plant mines... meaning there was cooperation and participation between the people of Jenin and the people of the camp.

You are talking about the last siege here...

Yes, about the last siege...

You spoke about learning from and overcoming mistakes from the five invasions that preceded the latest one. Give us an example of such learning from these five invasions?

For example, we did not expect the Israeli army to come on the Haifa-Jenin line during the first invasion, as this line passes through the district, which is the headquarters of the Jenin Governorate. This street was not in our calculations at all because we expected the army to enter us through Wadi Burqin, to enter the camp from the UNRWA Al-Madaris and from the Jenin Al-Mushtashfa [streets]. That is why all these streets, in addition to Al-Jabriyat, were planted with ground explosive devices. But they did not enter any of these roads and entered, as I said, from the Haifa road, continued to the district, and continued until they reached the headquarters of the Palestinian Special Forces For Rapid Intervention. Of course, all of this was not in our calculations because they arrived easily despite the presence of Palestinian forces and all the

security and police personnel. During the attack and destruction of the headquarters of the special forces, I remember that brother Mahmoud Tawalbeh bypassed all the decisions made by the leadership present in the camp and attacked the tank directly, where the headquarters of the special forces was, and there was fierce resistance.

Which leadership do you mean? Is it a national leadership?

Yes, the national leadership overrode its decision because we were forbidden from entering the district. As a resistance, we were not concerned about any resistance member entering these headquarters. We relied more on national security there, because national security could cover the defense of the district.

Do you remember who participated in the unified leadership of the resistance?

All Palestinian factions participated, and the most prominent leaders who were present were from the Al-Quds Brigades, the Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades, and the Izz Ad-Din Al-Qassam Brigades. They all participated without exception. However, there were leaders who had combat experience and who drew up the plans for us. Since some of the names are not known to the Israelis, it is wrong to mention them at this stage. Among the leaders and names that were prominent, I remember - may Allah have mercy on him - brother Mahmoud Tawalbeh, and brother Taha Al-Zubeidi from the Al-Quds Brigades, in addition to the role I played alongside these brothers. Among those who deserve pride and honor and to be awarded medals of honor is our brother Abu Al-Jandal. Of course, this brother had experience and we benefited from his experience, to the point that we relied on him completely. Any area that was handed over to him, we relied on him completely... because our contact with him was only if we needed ammunition... so that sometimes we would send him fighters... but he would say "I don't need fighters, I need ammunition, just send ammunition..." And indeed, we relied on him and his group to defend the western area of the camp, knowing that the enemy tried more than once to enter the camp through this area.

Who is the Abu Al-Jandal group composed of?

Unfortunately, everyone mistakenly believed they were from National Security. But on the third day of the siege, Abu Al-Jandal came with some of the brothers, including one nicknamed "the hyena." They came to my neighborhood, the Al-Hawashin neighborhood where I was. They also had with them a man from the Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades and another from the Izz Ad-Din Al-Qassam Brigades, Mahmoud Al-Hilweh. They said, "We are not from National Security." They literally said, "We are not honored because our leadership in National Security ordered us to withdraw and did not provide us with ammunition. We are now members of the organizations, and if you want to receive us in this capacity, then we belong to different factions. If you do not want to accept us in this capacity, then we are the sons of this people and we want to defend this camp because we are the sons of this camp." We told them, "We have the utmost

respect for you and will place you as a crown on our heads, and whatever you lack we will sacrifice our lives for you.” We pledged allegiance to them on the basis that they were sons of the factions. Indeed, after the invasion, some of them - may Allah have mercy on them - were martyred, and we were surprised to find that some were affiliated with the Izz Ad-Din Al-Qassam Brigades and were continuing with the National Security... and the National Security, as I said, did not interfere. On the contrary, they smuggled their weapons and ammunition before the invasion to the villages surrounding the city of Jenin.

Can we go back to before the siege... when they entered Ramallah...

Okay, but I want to tell you that there was a deception before this invasion, and unfortunately after we discovered it, we spread it (the news) to Balata Camp, but it was too late and the fighting brothers there had already left the camp. The brothers ordered us to withdraw all fighters from inside Jenin Camp.

Who are the brothers who ordered you?

All the political leaders ordered us... including the Al-Quds Brigades, Islamic Jihad, Hamas, and Fatah... to contact us at eleven o'clock... or the calls continued from ten o'clock until eleven o'clock, so that we would withdraw from the camp...

Who are the political leaders? If so, can you mention them by name?

The political leaders were Atta Abu Rumaila, Sheikh Jamal, and Sheikh Bassam. They ordered us to withdraw in accordance with what had been agreed upon between the national movements. Of course, these people had no connection to military work and no experience in this field. But they had agreed among themselves that we, as resistance fighters, would withdraw. And indeed, all the fighters withdrew from the Jenin Camp.

When did this happen and on what date?

This did not happen in the last invasion, but rather in the invasion before the last. And Allah knows that in a month... Unfortunately, they withdrew and we all withdrew as fighters from the camp. When we arrived in the city of Jenin, we found the Preventive Security gathering us and putting us in places they had designated. I was one of those who were put in a house near the "Gedim" settlement, and this settlement was close, so that they could shoot at us and hit us with M16 bullets while we were inside the house. We realized that there was a deception and we realized that there might be a political game as well, whereby the Israeli army would enter the camp and record a position that it had entered Jenin Camp and searched it completely. But when we realized all of that, we contacted our brothers from the resistance and the military and told them that they must all head to the camp. Everyone from all the factions returned, and the tide continued until three o'clock in the morning. Meanwhile, the Israeli army was advancing from the square near the mosque until it entered the camp, but they

could not enter as all the fighters had returned. This is what happened to us in Jenin Camp, and it happened in Balata Camp, where the youth of Balata Camp left and the Israeli army entered and searched the camp house by house. If we had not returned to the camp in Jenin, they would have done the same thing. This was among the mistakes we learned before the last invasion. They tried to repeat the matter in the last invasion. There was a rumor between two Palestinian security agencies and some fighters from the Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades to convince them to withdraw on the basis that they had safe places to stay. However, these leaders from the brigades, who are national and honorable leaders, refused that and insisted on staying in the camp and defending it, and indeed some of them were martyred and some were arrested. In general, we did not repeat the mistake that happened in Jenin Camp during the invasion before the last one. Rather, we learned other lessons that we benefited from, for example, from the Israeli army, which is that we did not move around in the streets and alleys, but rather we created gaps between the houses and moved through them. In the last invasion, we lay in ambush for the army inside the houses and in these gaps to surprise them, and that happened, and we were able to gain good control in the beginning over all areas of the camp.

When you were asked to withdraw from the camp during the penultimate invasion, what did you do with your weapons? Were they taken from you?

Our weapons remained with us and we could not hand them over to anyone. When we returned, we took them back to the camp. Of course, the landmines remained planted in the ground, as they could only be detonated by the brothers using batteries. Upon our return, we checked them and the young men were ready and sufficient to detonate them if the army advanced.

Before the penultimate invasion, the fifth invasion, and before the assassination of martyr Raed Al-Karmi of the Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades, you sent a letter to brother Abu Ammar, which was signed by the resistance forces. Tell us exactly what happened and what this letter contained...

Correct, I personally wrote this letter in my own handwriting and what happened is the following... There was a European delegation intending to visit Abu Ammar in the district in Ramallah and they asked him to cease fire. The Palestinian leadership sent us a message asking us fighters to stop military operations, whether in the 1948 territories or in the 1967 territories. They put us in an awkward situation and accused us of not being concerned about the interests of the Palestinian people. We told them that we are the complete opposite and that we are the people most concerned about the interests of the Palestinian people, and to prove that to you we are ready with whatever you order us to do. They said you have to stop firing. We told them okay... and they said you will be arrested so we agreed and the matter was done as follows: We sent an official letter to our brother Abu Ammar stating that we are with you and for a ceasefire to solve the problem. This letter was sent and a copy of it is with the National Security at the Jenin Governorate headquarters. The response was that we should stay with the

National Security as "guests." We agreed to this. I was with two brothers, one named Majdi Abu Al-Wafa and the other named Mohammed Al-Deek, a major in National Security. They arrested us and put us in an apartment in the eastern neighborhood of Jenin. We abided by what was agreed upon and one day we were surprised to find the Israeli army surrounding the place where we were. It was an apartment rented by the National Security. The neighbors stood on the roofs and said to us, "There is the Israeli jeep 20 meters below you." And I won't hide from you that we were taking our precautions and had communication devices and weapons with us. We contacted the brothers in the camp and they came immediately and clashed with the Israeli army. As a result, a young citizen was martyred while driving a tractor pulling a water tank. The plane bombed it and he was martyred immediately. Fayez Arafat, the commander-in-chief of the Jenin district with the rank of Brigadier General and who was responsible for security coordination, went out to hold a meeting on the same day with the Israelis in the "Gedim" settlement. This is according to the testimony of three armed men who were required to surrender themselves, meaning me, Majdi Abu Al-Wafa, and Mohammed Al-Deek. At that time, we had left the city of Jenin and left the house that they had put us in anyway. I remember that in light of the Israeli violation of the ceasefire, Yasser Atila (1) and another foreign journalist conducted an interview with me and I made it clear that Israel was responsible from now on for this violation. They asked me in the same interview if we were still committed to the ceasefire, and my answer was that there was no ceasefire anymore...

What was the message you talked about?

The Palestinian leadership sent us a message stressing the need for a ceasefire. In light of this, we held a meeting with our brothers in the Fatah and Hamas movements, and we came out of it agreeing that we would target only ambushes or explosive devices at military sites belonging to the army in our operations. This also applies to martyrdom operations. I conveyed the message to President Arafat, and it included a rejection of a ceasefire and the presentation of our aforementioned proposal that we were prepared for the battle to be between the Palestinian fighter and the Israeli soldier, and for the president to convey it to the American envoy, Zinni, who was in the region at that time.

Who signed this letter addressed to President Arafat?

I personally signed on behalf of the Al-Quds Brigades, affiliated with the Islamic Jihad movement, as well as Hamas, which had agreed in principle to this, in addition to the Fatah movement. A short time later, the Israeli response came with the assassination of Raed Al-Karmi in the city of Tulkarem.

Does the ceasefire included in the letter also include a halt to martyrdom operations?

No, we didn't talk about halting martyrdom operations, but rather about changing the targets, meaning that we would only target army forces, soldiers' camps, patrols, etc.,

1 - Arabic-speaking correspondent for Israel Radio.

and we would stand against any non-military target. Let me note here that I am convinced that the majority of Israeli society is militaristic, but at that time they killed five schoolchildren from Khan Yunis.

Did these events together precede the assassination of Raed Al-Karmi?

Yes, and as a result, we carried out a joint martyrdom operation with our brothers in the Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades in the heart of Afula. The operation was carried out by the martyr Abdel Kareem Abu Na'sa and the martyr Mustafa Abu Saria in response to the martyrdom of the five children.

Were there orders from the Palestinian leadership to security forces to participate in defending the camp, according to the narrative that spread at the time, or is there another version? Tell us the truth about what happened, in detail, if possible.

In truth, I don't know of any orders or decisions by the Palestinian leadership for the security forces to participate in the defense of the camp. I remember here that an officer in Force 21 (2) used to come to the camp and talk to the youth, asking about our needs. We used to tell him that we needed bullets and magazines and that we needed a certain quantity of them. He would hear that, leave, and then return after a while to ask the same question. The last time we affirmed to him that we wanted bullets... For your information, we were requesting bullets for the resistance fighters from the National Security, not for ourselves, since most of the fighters in the organizations carry M16 rifles, while the National Security is armed with Kalashnikovs, and these bullets are only available to the Palestinian Authority security services. Of course, this incident happened one day before the last invasion. Later, when we learned that the Israeli army would storm, we contacted him, but he had turned off all his phones. Two days later, the surprise came when we discovered that this officer and another officer were loading the weapons to be transported to the village "Sir" located in the Jenin Governorate. This event prompted us to go to the headquarters and head to the warehouses. We found only two boxes of bullets that we seized by force, while the rest of the ammunition and weapons were smuggled out in order to return them after the invasion. In my personal opinion, these weapons will return after the withdrawal of the Israeli army to be used against our people.

Does this mean there were no orders?

Yes, there were no orders, as evidenced by the fact that the martyr brother Abu Al-Jandal, may Allah have mercy on him, received a phone call from the district

2 - We decided to leave out the name of the agency and not publish the names of the officers mentioned to avoid legal issues and because we do not wish to engage in discussions of a personal nature, citizen.

commander informing him that he and his group must immediately withdraw from the Jenin Camp. Abu Al-Jandal refused, ended the call, and immediately broke his cell phone.

You mentioned that you had weapons and ammunition, and before the siege you seized another portion of ammunition. But how did you manage the shortages of ammunition, food, and water during the siege?

First, I would like to point out that our capabilities were modest, consisting of rifles and homemade explosive devices (IEDs), which were small barrels (one or one and a half inches). The rifles included two Galili rifles, several M16 rifles, several Kalashnikov rifles, and one RPG, along with only three shells. As for ammunition, each fighter had approximately ten magazines, and we relied heavily on IEDs. In addition, we had planted IEDs in the ground. I must say that we had placed some ammunition in secret houses for emergencies and used them in the process. In addition, we were able to seize weapons and ammunition from soldiers killed in the clashes, and when we surrendered, we had enough ammunition to last another week.

What was the moment you adopted in the confrontation during the invasion... and did any defect occur in the context of that?

I would like to point out at the outset that we had repelled an invasion of the camp a few days after Eid Al-Adha and were able to repel the attack at the time. There were fifteen days between this invasion and the last invasion, during which we worked in shifts, one group replacing the other to prepare explosive devices and other precautions. We were pressed for time and did not take enough time to properly prepare our affairs. We decided at the time not to hand over explosive devices to anyone until we were certain that the Israeli forces had begun moving towards Jenin. Indeed, the moment we felt that the army had begun its movement towards Jenin, we distributed the explosive devices. There was a shortage, and during that time we had planted mines in all the streets of Jenin Camp. They were explosive devices of varying sizes and shapes. Some of them were ground-based, which we used against tanks and operated on a spring, and the rest were side-mounted explosive devices. They were planted on all the roads in the camp...the UNRWA Al-Madaris street, the Jenin Al-Mustashfa street, and other areas except for the western neighborhood, where we feared that their detonation would cause harm to the residents due to the narrowness of the passages and the population density.

Did the explosive devices cause material or human losses to the Israeli army and its equipment?

We are talking about homemade explosive devices, and as they say, "a bullet that doesn't hit still makes a sound." (3) However, when these explosive devices did hit their

3 - In colloquial terms; it is deafening.

target, they did cause damage, and we were able to damage more than one tank. For example, on Al-Madaris Street, we were able to disable a tank, which led to its burning and the halting of other vehicles for several hours until they were withdrawn. This event raised our morale, in addition to our exploiting the time factor by delaying them. Of course, when the army discovered that its advance was slow inside the camp and that there were losses, it withdrew all the tanks and brought in a minesweeper that detonated all the explosive devices planted on Al-Mustashfa Street, as well as Al-Madaris Street. Then our focus shifted to side explosives and direct combat after the army took control of some streets and we stuck to the fortifications.

During the siege, how were you able to secure medicine for the wounded and food for the fighters?

After the ninth day, that is, after the residents left the camp, we experienced a shortage of food. We did not face any problems while they were there, as they provided us with water and food continuously. After the ninth day, we started collecting water jugs and placing them in the houses we passed so that the fighters could drink, and in this way we were able to overcome the problem of water availability. As for food, none of the fighters had an appetite, as our main concern was victory or martyrdom. While moving around the camp, we found some fruit and distributed it to the fighters, and it became our daily food. I would like to mention here the role of Umm Marwan Al-Washahi, Maryam Al-Washahi, 50 years old, who used to bring us food continuously, even after she saw her son's body shrouded. Despite that, she continued to bring us food until the soldiers shot her while she was carrying food on her head, and she was martyred. There are eyewitnesses that the army shot at her, knowing that she was a woman.

On what date was Umm Marwan martyred?

On the seventh or eighth day of the invasion.

There are some achievements that you have previously talked about, such as Umm Marwan Al-Washahi. Can you tell us about them?

I remember here one of the cubs called Osama Al-Saadi who had an (elbow) explosive (4) in his possession which he used as a prelude to throwing it at a tank that was passing in the street. Meanwhile, after he lit the elbow, it became clear to him that his friend was running in front of the tank. His friend shouted at him to throw the elbow, but he refused and the elbow exploded in his hand, leading to its amputation. We used to call these cubs the elbow cubs because they carried out many daring attacks against the enemy tanks during the invasion. I remember here Mohammad Al-Khatib when he went to scout the road and a sniper shot him in the shoulder. He immediately lay down on the ground and began crawling and then came back to us, saying, "I am wounded, please treat me." This cub stayed with us and left with us on the last day when we had

4 - It means an elbow pipe filled with explosives.

surrendered ourselves. Of course, there were other cubs, and I remember the names, or rather the nicknames, of some of them, such as a cub we called "the mosquito," the son of Abu Al-Rakez. This cub, who was 12 years old, had been wounded in the invasion and refused to surrender himself. We taught him how to use a gun, and we gave him a gun that he kept with him. He was very happy with it and went out with us on the day of surrender.

What do you think of the comparisons between Hezbollah and the resistance in the occupied territories?

In reality, we cannot be compared to Hezbollah because Hezbollah has international reach and open paths, while we, as the Palestinian people, have limited freedom of movement with our weapons in Area A. We are not allowed to bring weapons from abroad, and even if we were able to obtain a weapon, the Palestinian Authority would pursue us and confiscate it. Therefore, it is very difficult to compare ourselves to Hezbollah. However, we have a simple set of capabilities with which we can resist the occupation, and they remain weak, for example, against aircraft. We cannot confront aircraft, as we do not have anti-aircraft weapons, so our main reliance is on explosive devices when confronting tanks and other military vehicles. In addition, we are able to move in the small alleys of the camp while the Israeli soldier remains inside the tank. We hope, or we have hoped, that the [Palestinian] Authority will allow us to bring weapons, or at least turn a blind eye to us and not pursue us.

Tell us about the martyrdom of Mahmoud Tawalbeh... How did it happen? On which day of the invasion was he martyred? Where were you when it happened?

Brother Mahmoud, may Allah have mercy on him, was a fighting brother, and no matter how much we talk about him, we will not do him justice. He was responsible for the southern area of the camp as part of the plan, along with brothers Eid Faraj, Ashraf Abu Al-Haija, and Salim Al-Saadi, all of whom were martyred. Mahmoud was eager for martyrdom. When the army entered the western district, Mahmoud left his position and insisted on confronting the army. A confrontation did indeed take place between him and the soldiers. He managed to surround three soldiers in a building in the western area near Abu Aita's house, and a clash began with them. The soldiers were unable to leave the house, and it was difficult for the young men to enter the building. One of the brothers, upon Mahmoud's instructions, infiltrated with a can of fuel, and was ordered to burn down the entire house with the soldiers inside. The young men continued firing. When the army lost hope, it began shelling the house and the young men with rockets. Mahmoud then withdrew and returned to his position and waited for two days. Meanwhile, the army was storming from the western and eastern areas, where most of the pressure was coming from, considering these areas were open areas. The enemy failed to enter from Al-Mustashfa street, so brother Mahmoud went to Al-Damj

neighborhood and clashed with them for a whole night, during which brother Ziad Al-Zubeidi was martyred and the army withdrew from there. I estimate that the number of Israeli soldiers killed here was no less than seven soldiers. After the army withdrew, bulldozers entered Al-Damj neighborhood and demolished all the houses in the neighborhood. During that time, Mahmoud called me and told me what happened. He told me that the bulldozers were close to me, as I was in Al-Hawashin neighborhood. We could not believe that they had destroyed Al-Damj neighborhood, so we went and saw that Al-Damj neighborhood had become a football field.

Following this, the groups were re-formed, and we prevented any fighter from changing the position he was in. The army began trying to enter the southern area. They began trying to enter at first with an infantry unit, and there was a violent clash during which brother Iyad Tahseen was wounded. One of the brothers reached our side and asked for explosive devices and resistance fighters to cover the area. He was indeed supplied with the necessary supplies. While the brother was returning, the house where Mahmoud Tawalbeh and other brothers were located was bombed with four Energa shells. Mahmoud, Abdul Faraj, and Ashraf Abu Al-Haija were martyred. This was on the seventh day of the siege, April 6th, or April 7th. Of course, the martyrdom of Mahmoud and the brothers was a shock to us. After their martyrdom, the army took control of the southern area and it became easy for the enemy to descend into the center of the camp. The fighters were distributed on the outskirts of this area, and they focused on it, considering that the army entering only 15 meters meant controlling the entire camp. Indeed, the army tried to enter until it reached the house of Yahya Al-Zubeidi (a detainee). The army tried to bypass this house, but could not, so planes began bombing the positions where the resistance fighters were located. Since these positions were small alleys, there was no direct hit on any of the resistance fighters. There were houses that were destroyed, as the army spent a whole night bombing that area. Of course, the young men were unable to leave, and during that time, bulldozers arrived and began to demolish the houses, so we were then surrounded except for specific neighborhoods.

Have the camp residents left at this point?

At that time, we refused to allow any of the residents to surrender. The army announced to the residents via loudspeakers mounted on tanks that they had to surrender. Meanwhile, planes began randomly bombing without distinguishing between civilians and fighters. Consequently, we facilitated the residents' exit, and they did. We remained in three neighborhoods that were empty of residents. I remember here a man named Majed Al-Badawi, whom I think was the only one who refused to leave. He said that he wanted to stay with his family in the camp to help us, as his house was about twenty meters from the army sniper position. He helped us by providing us with water and information about the army's movements in the area. We moved during the day, as at night we were unable to move due to the army's ability to track us with its advanced equipment. The army discovered our positions and snipers started shooting at us. Sheikh Riyad was wounded in the leg from Deir Abu Al-Abd. Sheikh Riyad is from

Tulkarem and came to defend Jenin Camp. Of course we felt in danger and that we had been discovered. In light of that, we asked the family you mentioned to surrender themselves. They did so and a quarter of an hour after the family left the house, the house was hit with missiles. During the shelling, we were in the neighboring house, so we immediately got up and gathered in one room for safety. Shortly after that, Apache helicopters stopped their shelling and we felt that there were infantry soldiers advancing towards us. We learned during the siege that whenever the helicopters stop shelling, there is an advance of infantry soldiers. We started to observe carefully and during that, a bulldozer advanced from the center of the camp towards us, entered the house of Umm Mohammad Abu Saria and advanced towards the Al-Zubeidi neighborhood. We detonated a bomb with it, but it was not affected by it. One of the brothers tried to burn it by standing on the roof of one of the houses, pouring gasoline on it and setting it on fire, but to no avail and it was not affected. During that time, we continued to position ourselves in Talal Ruwaiha's house on the balcony overlooking the sniper position that we had discovered, but we could not determine its exact location. At that point, we were surprised by four soldiers in the "Al-Nashirti" house. Later, we learned that one of the brothers was with them as a prisoner, called "Mohammad Abu Saria." This young man was accompanied by four soldiers, and we learned from him later that they - the soldiers - entered the Al-Ragheb factory. From there, they made a hole in the wall in the "Al-Shalabi" house, to the "Abu Ali Awis" house and to the "Al-Nashri" house, and they climbed to the roof of the last building. During that time, we were positioned behind concrete columns on the balcony of the house, and the soldiers could not see us. As soon as they appeared, each fighter opened fire on one of the four soldiers. They were killed after the young man who was a prisoner with them, whom they had used as a human shield, escaped and confirmed to us that the four soldiers had been killed. The young men began to chant "Allahu Akbar," and we went down to the stairwell. An hour later, the bulldozers began to advance, and during that we blew up a tank that was accompanying them, and we were able to disable it. Then the planes arrived and started bombing Abu Saria's house and other houses. Then the bulldozers advanced and were able to detonate the explosives and demolish half of the house we were in. Then the snipers took up positions and focused on the house and other nearby houses. We tried to shoot at them, but we couldn't determine their exact location.

You talked about making plans for confrontation inside the camp. My question is: What is the most surprising action taken by the Israeli army in your account?

We expected everything except for Jenin Camp to be completely destroyed. This was not in our plans, and if it happened, we expected a genuine Arab stance from the masses of our nation, as we consider ourselves part of this Arab nation, and this is the opinion of the majority of the people of Jenin Camp. But unfortunately, the camp was demolished and the nation did not move. Regarding our expectations, we were expecting normal battles like the previous invasion. If there was a difference, it would be that the camp would be bombed with missiles from warplanes. However, we did not

expect the bulldozer, which we called the ghoul, to enter the camp. When it would hit one of the house pillars with the bulldozer, that would be enough to cause it to collapse. The explosive devices did not affect it, nor did the RPG shell fired by our brother Abu Al-Jandal. I remember here that the roof of a house fell on the bulldozer and nothing happened to it. We began to withdraw from house to house, as remaining in one location meant that we would be buried alive.

Regarding bulldozers, on what day did the army use bulldozers? And how many were there?

The bulldozer was used on the seventh day of the invasion, in Al-Damj neighborhood. They brought it in after facing fierce resistance there, as that neighborhood is characterized by its narrow alleys. The bulldozer proceeded to demolish that area, and a number of the resistance fighters were martyred there. The others withdrew. The bulldozer succeeded and they began using it in the other neighborhoods, as one bulldozer advanced from Al-Damj neighborhood to Al-Hawashin neighborhood, and another from the camp square. I saw four bulldozers when we were surrounded on the ninth day advancing towards us from all positions, and after we left, I saw more than ten bulldozers of varying sizes.

We move on to the martyrdom of Abu Al-Jandal. What is his real name?

His full name is Youssef Mohammed Abu Al-Jandal, and his family name is Kabha. I believe that is his full name, as we were not interested in knowing all the names of the young men, as we were only interested in knowing their surnames.

Tell us about the martyrdom of Abu Al-Jandal, as there is a story that says he was eliminated after being arrested?

All respect and appreciation to the martyr Abu Al-Jandal, who deserves all the medals of honor. This fighter did not miss a confrontation with the army. He was truly like a bird in the camp. You would see him flying and resisting everywhere. I remember once I asked him to come to the location I was in, and within seconds he was with me with an RPG launcher. Abu Al-Jandal was in Lebanon, and underwent many military training courses. He was one of the participants in the Tunnel Intifada several years ago (September 1996). I remember that Abu Al-Jandal once wounded an occupation officer on the bypass road around Jenin. After that, we heard that the Jenin area command wanted to demote his rank, and he was transferred to an area called Al-Hashimiya in the Jenin district. I would like to point out here that the Al-Hashimiya area is an area of direct contact with the enemy. At any moment, it could be stormed by special forces. But Abu Al-Jandal is a smart and careful man. He was very careful while he was at the checkpoint that was placed upon him. When the final battle came, he came to the camp. After receiving an order to leave the camp, as I had mentioned this event previously, he promised us that he was a free, honorable, patriotic fighter who would defend the homeland until the last drop.

After killing 13 soldiers, we were under great pressure, as the bombing intensified on us by planes and tanks, and there was a tank in the Al-Jabriyat area firing rockets at us in addition to the planes. Some of the brothers (this was on the ninth day) were disturbed and surrendered themselves, and two groups remained in the camp and we were overcome by a feeling that this battle was decisive, either we exist or we do not exist, one near Talal Ruwaiha's house and the other in Abu Al-Sabaa' neighborhood. During that, one of the fighters from the other group came and told me that the morale of the young men was collapsing. Several rumors spread, including that I had surrendered myself, another that I had been martyred, and many others about a number of fighters. I told the group that was with me that I would return shortly and headed out with the fighter, Ashraf Al-Saadi, Mahmoud Abu Al-Saeed, and I went and knocked on the door of the house, but no one answered, so we broke down the door and discovered that the young men were in the house next door, so we snuck in through an opening in the wall. Brother Abu Al-Jandal met us and when we saw him, he put his hand over my mouth, so I knew that there was an army nearby. Abu Al-Jandal was also accompanied by Mahmoud Al-Hilweh and another fighter nicknamed Al-Dabaa and others. I learned that only one room separated us from the army. The brothers told me that they had recited Al-Fatiha (Quranic verse) for their souls and that they had set up an ambush for the army. I asked them why we should wait and not go to them. They said that the army would, as usual, make a hole in the wall and enter, and then we would pounce on them. Indeed, we stayed with them, some of them slept while the others remained awake. Around three o'clock, I saw Abu Al-Jandal with three fighters positioned on a small bulwark in the house. I asked him why they were there. He told me that if the house was stormed, the soldiers would clash with us, and when they entered, they would surprise us and shoot at the soldiers. Indeed, we stayed like that. It was around 5:00 AM when I heard the sound of a bulldozer advancing, so we started looking through a crack in the window. It was indeed bulldozing in our direction, so one of the brothers sent word to Abu Jandal and the fighters with him to take positions on the ground floor, as engaging the bulldozer was useless. We would shoot at it and it would bounce back at us. Around 6:30 AM, the bulldozer started demolishing the house we were in, and split it in half. Immediately, a part of it started coming out of the hole in the wall. Abu Jandal said he would jump from the balcony, as we were 11-12 people and we couldn't all get out of the hole considering the bulldozer was bulldozing the house. Abu Jandal went to the balcony, and there the snipers shot him, and he was wounded. He screamed and told us that he was wounded. We tried to shoot to get him out, but the snipers started shooting at us, and a tank also joined in. Abu Al-Jandal told us to go, and I will manage myself. Of course, we were unable to rescue Abu Al-Jandal, so the army advanced towards him and eliminated him, noting that he was wounded in the foot.

They eliminated him because you left him wounded?

Yes, he was alive and talking to us while we talked to him.

Is there an eyewitness who saw the army shooting Abu Al-Jandal when he was arrested?

I saw the picture when I arrived at prison. We left Abu Al-Jandal with a wounded leg. His body wasn't burned or anything. Of course, we withdrew and took up positions at the home of someone named Ali Al-Habib. One of the brothers came to us and said that Abu Al-Jandal had been martyred and that the army was present, right where we were, and that Abu Al-Jandal's body had been taken away from there.

When you heard the bulldozer coming, could you get out of the house?

Yes, that's what happened. We were withdrawing, but Abu Jandal did not withdraw from the breach, but rather went out from the balcony, and the sniper shot him. This was Abu Jandal's choice, and his martyrdom had a profound effect on the young men's morale. We calmed them down and remained in Ali Al-Habib's house. There, we were besieged in several other houses, such as Abu Anwar Al-Hamed's house. We gathered, carrying several mobile phones the youth had seized from the army, as well as M16 rifles. We had previously cleaned these of blood, as the soldiers' blood on their weapons is a testament to the enemy's casualty rate in the camp. We also seized other combat equipment. I remember here that one of the young men was martyred while trying to remove the necklace of one of the dead soldiers from his neck, and the tank shot him. Another was trying to take the bandolier of one of the dead soldiers, and the sniper shot him, and he was martyred. During that time, a dog—I wouldn't be exaggerating if I said it was about a meter long—entered our room, and the fighters opened fire on it. Later, they found a device attached to its neck, so we got rid of the device, but we didn't know what it was. We thought at the time that we had been discovered, so we went to another house belonging to the martyr Fouad Al-Damj. The house was completely burned down, and we thought that they hadn't paid attention to it during the night. The plane continued to fire at the house we were in until the morning.

Do you know any of the occupation's agents inside the camp during the siege?

In reality, there were certainly agents. However, it was difficult [for them] to directly monitor and pursue the wanted fighters. An agent, no matter how brazen, would never see rockets and missiles being fired here and there, sacrificing himself to continue drafting his reports and moving from place to place to uncover and monitor mujahideen and fighters. We sensed the role of agents during interrogation. Perhaps some agents submitted their reports in the early days, and sometimes the intelligence questions during the interrogation were based on these reports. We knew this from the level of unimportant and incomplete information they possessed. However, after the fighting intensified in the camp, where shelling began to randomly cover the entire area, I am certain that no agent remained in the camp. From the sixth or seventh day of the siege, it was impossible for any agent to remain there, no matter how bold or courageous.

Rumors spread in the camp that graffiti was found on the destroyed walls glorifying "Free Lebanon." This served as confirmation that soldiers from the former Lahad Army participated in the invasion of the camp. What is your comment on this?

I believe these rumors are false. The intensity of the fighting between us and the enemy in the camp made it difficult for a soldier, whether from Lahad or the Israeli enemy, to consider getting out of their tanks and risking his life to write on the walls "Long Live Free Lebanon" or something similar. Before we left the camp, it was impossible for the infantry soldiers to enter any neighborhood in the camp. They only moved with tanks and bulldozers. Whoever thought of entering the camp did not leave unharmed. Perhaps what the media reported about the presence of Lahad elements happened after we left the camp. However, while we were there, I do not believe that was the case. Perhaps these are just rumors from a fifth column or inspired by weak and unconscious souls who were terrified by the bombing and the crimes that took place, so they allowed their imagination to run wild. It happened more than once that it was said about the presence of the army in a place or neighborhood inside the camp. When we investigated the matter, it became clear to us that what was said was not true. Many rumors spread and sometimes harmed us, but we worked to track them down and quickly expose their inaccuracy, such as talk of booby-trapped houses and martyrdom-seekers (resistance fighters with explosive belts), and the exaggeration of the death toll and talk of 500 to 1,000 dead in the camp. All of this was a media war aimed at winning over public opinion and inciting it against this heinous crime, and at the same time to deter the enemy from taking further brutal steps, and to save what was possible, as the actual demolition of the camp began. Some of us considered these rumors harmful and did nothing to benefit us.

What is the actual extent of the destruction in your opinion and estimate, and approximately how many homes were destroyed?

It would have been better and easier to answer if you had asked me how many houses were not destroyed. The reality of the destruction in the camp is terrifying and has exceeded all expectations, so it is impossible to count what was destroyed. If we think about what was not destroyed, we will determine the following: The main mosque of the camp was not destroyed, in addition to the neighborhood next to it. On the eastern side of the camp, there is a brick factory that was used as a camp, which protected parts of it from demolition. As for the houses and neighborhoods surrounding the factory, they were all bombed by missiles, and what was not destroyed was completely burned, like my brother's house, which was also completely burned, and the house of one of the neighbors.

Is it possible to say that 80% of the camp was destroyed?

I say that the percentage may have exceeded 90 because the houses we are talking about that were not destroyed are only on the outskirts of the camp, and even their surroundings are uninhabitable due to the cracks and large fires that afflicted them as a result of the missile bombing. As for the rest of the houses, they were razed to the ground.

As for the houses, what can you tell us about the actual number of martyrs, both fighters and civilians? Given that during the battles you were talking about around 1,000 martyrs, what is the truth?

Regarding the fighters who were martyred as a result of the invasion, they did not exceed 35 fighters combined. As for the civilians, approximately 60-70 were martyred, some of whom were delayed, and some were executed and eliminated by the army after their arrest. They were lined up against the walls and killed, like what happened to Jamal Al-Sabbagh and Abdel Kareem Al-Sabbagh, whose execution I witnessed with my own eyes, as he was not far from us when they arrested him. After searching him, they shot him. The same happened to Abdul Karim Al-Saadi and Wadah Al-Shalabi, all of whom were civilians who had no connection to the fighters. A number of our brothers witnessed their execution on the railway opposite of the agency office. As for the total number of fighters who were present in the camp from the beginning of the siege, it did not exceed 100 fighters. However, these heroes were all martyrs ready to be martyred at any moment. If there had been 100 explosive belts, each one of them would have taken one without hesitation.

Do you remember the day and date on which the executions mentioned took place?

I think it happened on the fifth day of the invasion, I don't really remember the exact day...

During the siege, you announced the presence of martyrdom-seekers (resistance fighters with explosive belts). Israel used this as an excuse to justify its indiscriminate killing, even of civilians, under the pretext that these civilians might be martyrdom-seekers (resistance fighters with explosive belts), as happened in some cases. They also said, to bolster their claim, that the 13 soldiers were killed in the camp using martyrdom-seekers (resistance fighters with explosive belts) against them. The question is, how true is your use of martyrdom-seekers (resistance fighters with explosive belts)? What is your personal assessment of your announcement of the presence of martyrdom-seekers (resistance fighters with explosive belts)?

We have previously said that the announcement of the presence of martyrdom-seekers (resistance fighters with explosive belts) may have been wrong and did not serve us at all, because some of the bombed houses were planned to contain martyrdom-seekers (resistance fighters with explosive belts), but they left these houses before they were

bombed. I am certain that the enemy did not do what it did out of fear of the presence of martyrdom-seekers (resistance fighters with explosive belts), but rather used it as a pretext to destroy and subjugate the camp and kill as many of its people as possible, to act as a deterrent to others. Therefore, it bombed some civilian gatherings that were known to it to be civilian. It was supposed to, as part of our defensive confrontation plan, use some martyrdom-seekers (resistance fighters with explosive belts). For example, it was decided to keep martyrdom-seekers (resistance fighters with explosive belts) in my house and in the designated area. However, at the last minute, we estimated that the enemy would destroy these places without entering or approaching them, so we canceled the plan and withdrew the martyrdom-seekers (resistance fighters with explosive belts).

So, do you consider this announcement to be wrong?

Yes, announcing the presence of martyrdom-seekers (resistance fighters with explosive belts) was a mistake. It would have been better to keep it secret so that the enemy would be practically surprised by it without noticing it in advance... However, the media did not have mercy on us, and broadcasted what was known to a narrow circle via satellite channels. This point was used against us instead of in our favor, although I am certain that Sharon's plan to destroy the camp, which he considered in more than one of his statements to be a Hornet's Nest, would not have changed whether we announced the presence of martyrdom-seekers (resistance fighters with explosive belts) or not, because the intention was to crush and destroy the entire camp.

You used rumors in your war against the enemy, including announcing the martyrdom of a number of fighters and other rumors. Tell us about this topic...

I will not hide from you that our greatest feeling of danger and pressure began after the killing of the 13 soldiers, that is, after the eighth day. This feeling did not stem from a lack of weapons or fighters, but rather from our realization that the plan to destroy and wipe out the camp was no longer just talk, but rather practical steps had begun. It was necessary to take a step that would take one of the cards out of the enemy's hand, which was the card of the fugitives, which was used as one of the main arguments for entering the camp. So we announced (a rumor) about the martyrdom of all the fugitives present in the camp with the aim of relieving the pressure if possible. Among the most important fugitives and those wanted by the enemy, whose martyrdom was announced, were me, Thabet Al-Mardawi, Mahmoud Tawalbeh, and Qais Adwan.

Wasn't Mahmoud Tawalbeh already martyred at that time?

Yes, and we found that confirming the martyrdom of Al-Tawalbeh and adding the other three names to the list might make the enemy believe the rumor and ease the pressure on the camp, but that did not help at all. In general, the enemy later denied the martyrdom of the three, and confirmed only the martyrdom of the Al-Tawalbeh.

Tell us about the special way you received the news of the army's advance towards the camp?

What happened was really funny. Since we were expecting the army to come, we had prepared a large number of colorful holiday fireworks and distributed them all over the camp. There was a Sufi sheikh who had religious tools such as drums, maces, etc. When the news arrived that the army was at Harsh Al-Saada and advancing towards the camp, the brothers started shooting fireworks from all directions over the camp, while the sheikh, who was nicknamed "the lamb", started lining up the brothers in a single line and started beating drums and other tools, and he and a number of young men went around the streets of the camp as if in a festive atmosphere. He was urging steadfastness and not being afraid, that the drums of war had been beaten, and that heaven awaited the martyrs. This created an atmosphere of joy and raised the morale of the residents and fighters, which seemed like a reception for tanks and planes... As if death was no longer something that a person in the camp feared.

What about using speakers?

Most of the groups around the camp had loudspeakers that we used to shout "Allahu Akbar," call out to each other, and for other purposes. When the enemy began besieging the camp and used their loudspeakers to demand that the camp surrender and hand over the fighters' weapons, we began responding in kind. As soon as the Israeli soldier finished his sentence, we began asking him to surrender, throw down his M16, and surrender himself. He would be honored and respected until we returned him to Sharon, otherwise he would see the horrors and be torn to pieces from the camp. We also tried to raise people's morale by shouting "Allahu Akbar" and denying what the enemy was saying, because after the fifth day some people began to think about surrendering themselves. Therefore, we had to convince people of the importance of staying around us. We addressed them by saying: The enemy's threat to bomb the camp with F16s is only to instill fear in you and force you to leave your homes to make the task easier for him. If you stay, he will not be able to carry out his threats. This talk convinced some people and others weren't... We told the people that the enemy was executing those who surrendered themselves, and indeed, this happened in front of us, as I mentioned earlier. All of this helped delay the evacuation of the camp, but later, when the fighting intensified and we felt that the enemy's brutality knew no bounds and that keeping civilians with us would not deter them, we asked the residents to leave the camp and go to safe places. In general, the use of loudspeakers had a clear effect in shaking the enemy soldiers' spirits. During one of the battles, we heard some of them crying bitterly, begging us and asking us not to kill him, that he would lay down his weapons and surrender himself.

Tell us about the number of soldiers killed in the battles, according to your estimate. The enemy's account spoke of 26-28 soldiers, including the 13 who fell into the ambush. What are the correct numbers?

Let's start very simply together by naming the locations and the number of soldiers killed at each location, and I will leave it to you at the end to add up the total number. This information is confirmed by the brothers, eyewitnesses on the battlefield. In Al-Damj neighborhood, the brothers called and said that they had seven bodies of enemy soldiers. There were 3 soldiers who were burned by the martyr Mahmoud Tawalbeh near Abu Aita's house. I don't know the name of the owner of the house where they were burned exactly, but in the same neighborhood where Raja Abu Aita was in the western neighborhood. In the Abu Al-Jandal area, Al-Amouri neighborhood, the enemy carried out a ground operation of about 25 soldiers who were confronted by the brothers there. Abu Al-Jandal contacted us via the messenger and said that they had 5 bodies of enemy soldiers. In the Abu Darwish Abu Al-Haija neighborhood, 6 soldiers tried to enter from there, so 3 of them were killed and the remaining 3 fled. From Dar Al-Nasharti, 4 soldiers tried and with them was Mohammad Abu Saria, who was taken as a human shield. He confirmed to us and said, "I bear witness to that I saw with my own eyes the killing of the 4 soldiers there." From Al-Jabriyat area, 5 enemy soldiers descended towards Al-Samran neighborhood. There was an ambush for some brothers and one of the martyrs who stormed in and blew himself up with them and killed them. The soldiers, and for this martyr there is a videotape of his will that will be shown later, and there are also the 13 soldiers who fell at once in the Al-Hawashin neighborhood. If we add these numbers, we will have obtained statistically the number of dead soldiers, which is 40 dead soldiers. This number can be confirmed by counting the weapons that are now in the camp and with the organizations, which belong to these soldiers, and among these pieces are several "Mags" and long and short M16 rifles that the enemy army carries.

It is essential, Hajj Abu Ali, that you tell us about some examples of the martyrs who fell while confronting the aggression on the camp, such as the martyr hero Taha Al-Zubeidi, may Allah have mercy on him.

Brother Taha Al-Zubeidi was one of the commanders of the Al-Quds Brigades, and he had actual participation in many operations such as the Afula and Khadera operations in which two martyrs participated, Yusef Al-Suwaiti and Nidal Abu Shaqra. His role in these operations was major, and in short, he was a mujahid and a fighter who possessed a high fighting spirit. A brave man whose level of bravery and sacrifice are beyond description for his age, as he was no more than 25 years old. He was engaged and postponed his wedding date three times, and the postponements were linked to the successive invasions leading up to the last invasion, in which he was martyred. His wedding date was scheduled for April 2002, and with his martyrdom he was married before this date, but to 72 hours (maidens) in heaven. The moral was in the way he was martyred. He sacrificed his life to defend his brothers and comrades and ensure their safety. Some of the brothers wanted to move from one area to another in order to leave the camp. He had to secure the route they would take and the place they would stay in if the safe route was not possible. However, during his attempt, he discovered the route above Al-Jabareen neighborhood. He was surprised by a treacherous bullet from a sniper that landed directly in his chest. One of the brothers then tried to pull him

out from under the shelling and provide him with first aid or get him out of that house, but he was unable to due to the missile shelling that the helicopter launched on the house. One of the missiles initially hit a neighboring room, forcing the brothers to immediately withdraw from the house. They returned after the shelling had subsided to find that a missile had hit the room where the martyr was, which led to his body being burned except for one of the two headbands he had with him. The martyr used to carry two headbands, one on which was written "Soldiers of Allah" and the other "There is no god but Allah." To clarify, the "Soldiers of Allah" headband came about as a result of a specific incident in the camp between the brothers. Some of them wrote and distributed these headbands, and after the incident passed, the brothers returned and put up the "There is no god but Allah, Muhammad is the Messenger of Allah" headband. I was told, as I did not see the body myself, that this last headband was the only thing that did not burn with the body. With this, this mujahid achieved the martyrdom he had wished for, as he often insisted on being one of the martyrs. I recorded several cassettes of him about some of the operations on the bypass road and other military operations that he carried out. There is also a recorded will of his, and all of these cassettes will appear later, God willing, because they are being preserved and protected.

A few days ago, Al-Quds newspaper published an appeal from Umm Mohammad Al-Turkman to UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, asking him to help uncover the fate of her missing son, Mohammad Turkman. According to the appeal, we learned from you that you have confirmed information about the fate of Al-Turkman.

Brother Mohammad Al-Turkman, whose nickname was Mohammad Al-Badawi, is the brother of the martyr Lutfi Al-Turkman, may Allah have mercy on him. He is one of the best heroic brothers in Jenin Camp, and he deserves all the appreciation and respect. This brother was with the martyred brothers Mustafa Al-Shalabi and Mohammad Al-Nursi, and three National Security officers who were martyred in a house near the Al-Hamduni house. He had been wounded by shrapnel in his feet and was transferred by the brothers to the house I was in at the time, the house of the martyr Mustafa Abu Saria. With Mohammad was another young man, Raed Al-Hanoun, who had been injured by shrapnel. We tried to call an ambulance to take them to the hospital, but it couldn't reach us. There was a doctor from the Al-Nashiri family who was unable to come, so we were able to send one of the cubs to his house to provide us with some gauze and necessary medication. The assistance was useless. We tried to bandage the wound with some rags taken from the tape, and we tried to elevate his feet and support them with a pillow to at least slow the bleeding. At first, we felt this had a positive effect. What encouraged us was that Brother Mohammad was constantly talking to us, unlike the other wounded person, whose condition we feared more because his wound was in the abdomen and the shrapnel was lodged there, and he was silent and did not speak. Despite the effort we made to stop the bleeding from the feet of the martyr Mohammad, we failed and found that the pillow on which his feet were raised was now filled with blood. Since the army at that time was cold-bloodedly

eliminating every fighter they captured, we feared for him from the same fate if we took him out and handed him over to the army. We hoped that the bleeding would stop and he would stay with us until we could transfer him to the hospital. While we were in this situation, tanks and bulldozers began to approach the neighborhood we were in, and we began to feel that the place was no longer safe for the wounded brothers, so we moved them to another house near the house of Ibrahim Al-Damj. We also had with us the body of the martyr Munir Al-Washahi, which we were unable to transfer with us that same night. Later, one of the brothers came to me to tell me of the martyrdom of Mohammad Al-Badawi, who is Mohammad Al-Turkman. His body remained in the house he was transferred to near the house of Ibrahim Al-Damj until the bulldozers reached it and buried his body under the rubble of that house. Meanwhile, I learned that the other wounded brother Raed Al-Hanoun survived his wound and is now in Asqalan prison.

Was Al-Turkman martyred as a result of the injury?

It was rumored that the occupation soldiers, upon arriving at that house, shot him and killed him, but I firmly believe that brother Mohammad was martyred while being transferred from one house to another... because the amount of blood he bled was so large that one of the pillows that I rested his feet on was as heavy as a gallon of water when I carried it from the amount of blood it absorbed from the martyr. His condition, according to the brothers' assessment, was very difficult, as his body began to cool down to a great degree, and sometimes his temperature rose greatly as a result of his wound. Then the bulldozers came and demolished the house over the body.

What happened to the second body?

As for the second body, that of the martyr Munir Al-Washahi, we were later able to move it to another house so that his mother could see him before burying him. The house he was moved to belonged to Khalil Al-Nursi. The martyr Mohammad Al-Nursi came and asked that the body be moved to Ibrahim Al-Nursi's house so that his mother could see him. He actually took the body after the rest of the wounded had been moved, and his mother came and saw him. Shortly after she left, the news of her martyrdom was broadcast. A martyr and the mother of a martyr.

What is the story of Raed Al-Farir?

Brother Raed Al-Farir was one of the brothers who sustained a serious wound in his back during the clashes. He was in the building we were in, and in it were the bodies of two martyrs, one of whom was Munir Al-Washahi. As we estimated that Raed Al-Farir was in his last moments of life, we told him to lie down between the two bodies and recite Al-Fatiha (Quranic verse) for his soul. Indeed, we left him lying between the two martyrs. After about 20 or 30 minutes had passed, and we had moved a little away from his place, the surprise was that we turned around to find brother Raed Al-Farir chasing us, running and laughing, and saying, "Look, I am not dead." So I told him, "Then run between the fighters, we are all here candidates for martyrdom, so do not

rush it, it is coming." But he recovered from his wounds after his arrest, and now he is in Asqalan prison as well.

How were the 13 Israeli soldiers killed? Was there a planned operation and a premeditated ambush?

Before discussing this operation, it is necessary to pause at the names of those heroic brothers: Nidal Al-Nubani, Amjad Al-Fayed, and Mohammed Al-Fayed. These three were among the fiercest fighters in the camp. Before Nidal became an officer in the Preventive Security Service, he was a cadre of the First Intifada. He was captured and tortured for being a free and honorable man. Whenever he saw an occupation patrol while working for the Preventive Security Service, he opened fire on it without any orders. His actions were protested by the DCO, and after being punished by the officials in the service, he was completely banned from carrying a weapon. The Second Intifada began while he was in this state. The deprivation continued until the last invasion took place, and despite the abundance of weapons, it is difficult to find a piece without its bearer. This brother was eager to carry a weapon, and we finally succeeded in securing a Kalashnikov machine gun and delivered it to brother Nidal, who was overjoyed and could not believe what he was seeing, because the period of deprivation from carrying a weapon was harsh and bitter for him and it saddened him. After that, he began to move from one place to another, searching for Israeli soldiers until fate willed it and the day of April 9, 2002, came, while he was present in Al-Hawashin neighborhood, and with him were the two brothers, Mohammed and Amjad Al-Fayed, who are also fierce fighters, and they were in the first invasions in the vanguard of those who confronted and at the head of the fighters. On that day, at exactly 6:15 in the morning, these three brothers were in Al-Hawashin neighborhood, this neighborhood has narrow alleys with difficult paths, and entering and exiting it is not easy for the people of the camp, let alone a stranger to that area. While the three brothers and some of the cubs were in one of the alleys, they saw five enemy soldiers armed with MAG and M16 machine guns descending. The tanks and bulldozers had not yet reached Al-Hawashin neighborhood. It was known that controlling that neighborhood meant controlling most of the camp. We let the five soldiers advance because the nature of their movements and their turning in all directions indicated that they were a reconnaissance force and that another force was behind them to protect them. Without the enemy detecting our move, some of the brothers advanced to the beginning of the alleys, which were no more than 10 to 15 meters long. They took up combat positions from the front of the entrances to their ends, and distributed themselves in a triangular shape so that none of them would hit the other during the clash. They instructed some of the cubs to be present and hide in the middle of that triangle with a group of elbow explosives in their possession. When the five soldiers, followed by seven other soldiers, reached the middle of the triangle, the cubs began throwing flak jackets. They managed to throw about six flak jackets that exploded among the enemy soldiers. The cubs were instructed to hide at the bottom of the wall when they heard gunfire in their direction and to stay there. The plan after the flak was to storm the camp with machine guns, shouting "Allahu Akbar" as a signal to fire the machine guns. Meanwhile, the screams of

the soldiers could be heard in most parts of the camp, while the three brothers' machine guns were finishing them off, as they were all lying on the ground. During the attack, the brothers found three living soldiers who were shocked to see the rest of their comrades dead. They threw down their weapons, raised their hands, and began wailing. They began to plead not to kill them, but the brothers did not respond to them and opened fire on them, killing them...

Some may ask why we didn't capture them. The answer is that the situation didn't allow for a fighter to move around alone, let alone if he had captives with him. Moreover, the army was prepared to kill its own soldiers and those with them, as it did in the previous invasion when it bombed a building in which a group of soldiers and some fighters were besieged. If we allow these soldiers to return to where they came from, they will return again to kill us, because they were only there for that purpose. After finishing off the entire attacking force, the chanting and cheering began in the neighborhood, and a number of brothers and some young men gathered and some of the brothers began gathering the soldiers' sleeves from their bodies. This was done in a way that indicates the lack of experience of these fighters in how to behave properly in such a situation. The weapons that we took were two "Mag" type machine guns, short and long M16 rifles, and a bag. For first aid, there were also three green MERS devices that were in the possession of the force commander. In addition to the bullet magazines, we also found around the neck of each soldier a black string from which hung something like a medal covered in cloth (meaning a dogtag on which the soldier's number was written). The brothers took it out of curiosity, and we found that it contained the soldier's number and name. Meanwhile, we asked all the brothers to withdraw from the area in case it was bombed. Brother Nidal, may Allah have mercy on him, was wrapping a Mag pouch around his waist and carrying a Mag piece with a Kalashnikov rifle because he considered himself to be the one who had the favor of Allah Almighty for this victory, so he proudly kept it in his hand. While we were moving away from the dead soldiers, there were still four brothers nearby, and we were thinking of setting up another ambush to strike the force that might come and retrieve the bodies when very heavy fire was unleashed. The first shots hit brother Nidal, who was martyred instantly. The remaining three brothers tried to take cover, but they could not, so the brothers Mohammed and Amjad Al-Fayed were martyred, while the fourth brother was wounded at that time. Since we were not far from the scene of the event, we began firing towards enemy fire and discovered that the confrontation was now with tanks that had begun to enter the Al-Hawashin neighborhood from the Al-Damj neighborhood. I would like to point out that the time that the operation took from the beginning until the withdrawal took 15-20 minutes, after which the three brothers were martyred. After that, we were able to spread behind a barrier and began a violent clash with the force that began to advance to retrieve the bodies. We were able to stop their advance and prevent them from achieving their goal from approximately 7:00 AM until 1:00 or 2:00 PM. During that period, they were using loudspeakers to ask us to give them a chance to retrieve the bodies, after which they would withdraw completely.

As fighters, we considered their entry into Al-Hawashin neighborhood to mean the fall of the camp, and for this reason we refused a ceasefire. The resistance had to continue and they had to be prevented from removing the bodies. Meanwhile, the Apache helicopter began shelling our positions, so we took fortifications near Al-Hawashin neighborhood in the house of one of the camp residents named Ali Al-Habib. The Apache fired approximately 12 missiles and withdrew. Then some of the brothers began trying to clean the weapons of the soldiers' blood. I asked them to leave the blood on the weapons so that the world would witness later during the campaign and siege the fragility and quality of the Israeli soldier who is strengthened by advanced and modern weapons. Indeed, the brothers stopped cleaning the weapons. In order to be ready for the coming battle, we asked the brothers to take advantage of the relative calm to get some rest, because the night was theirs while the day was ours. The house had three rooms, and the brothers were distributed among them after securing a shift and guarding. I went to rest a little in one of the rooms, so I stretched out with the weapon on my chest. Not long after, I heard heavy gunfire inside the room I was in, so I quickly got up and asked what was wrong. One of the brothers said, "There is an army." It turned out that one of the enemy's trained dogs had suddenly entered the house. The brothers realized that behind the dog was an army. Some of them shot the dog and killed it, and the others began shooting randomly from the doors and windows. I immediately asked the brothers to stop shooting because they were shooting at something that was not visible or present. There was fear that we would hurt each other, and that a number of young men would go out to reconnoiter to see if there were soldiers or not. Indeed, the brothers calmed down, and we examined the dog, whose blood was flowing, and we examined the entrance from which it came, but there was nothing suspicious. One of the cubs came out and lay down in a corner overlooking the entrance that led to us, and informed us that there was no sign of the army, which reassured the fighters even more. We told them that you are now safe and asked them to bring the dog in and keep it away from us because of the unbearable smell of its blood. Of course, life had become difficult for us in that house and we stayed until morning. The Apache and tank were shelling the house next to us all night, where we had been previously. Every shell caused a huge fire. In the morning, we were surprised by bulldozers heading towards us. They did not know exactly where we were, but the tank was demolishing houses randomly. At that point, we left the house and divided ourselves into two groups. The first headed to Abdul Abu Al-Dhiyab's house and took up positions there, and the other spread out in a second neighborhood, whose exact location I did not know.

How many of you were there?

At that time, our group was between 20-25 fighters. After spreading out, we were not far from each other. While we were sitting, we saw a missile attack on a house next to us, "Abu Mohammad Khalil Musa's house." It caught fire for the second time during the events, and a house next to it caught fire. We were in the house and nothing happened to us, as our place was on the ground floor among several buildings surrounding it. As a plan to make the enemy believe that our place was empty and burned, we asked one of

the brothers to light one of the mattresses at the entrance of the house. And so it happened that the enemy did not stop at burning the houses. Despite the fires raging in many of the houses around us, the bulldozers were advancing towards them and demolishing everything in their path. One of the brothers was even preparing vermicelli soup for us that he had found in the kitchen of one of the houses. When it was ready, we found that the bulldozers had reached us, so we quickly left the house, as the tank arrived and demolished the house we were in. After that we moved to the house of a person called Abu Anwar, who was originally from "Nuris." We sat in his house for about a quarter of an hour, after which we felt that we were starting to be exposed to the army. This happened on the tenth day... and our movement seemed completely exposed to the army... so we moved from Abu Anwar's house to a house next to and opposite the house we were in, which was the house of a person called Abu Al-Hamed, and our number did not exceed 15 fighters.

Was Abu Al-Jandal with you at that time?

No, by then Abu Al-Jandal had been martyred, may Allah have mercy on him. We sat in that house and while some fighters were guarding the doors and windows, one of them came forward to tell me that there were the sounds of footsteps advancing towards us. We immediately prepared ourselves for a new clash and began to verify the sound, the sound of footsteps. Through the windows, we realized that those coming were our brothers. Among them were brother Jamal Huwail, brother Omar Al-Sharif, brother Issam Abu Al-Sabaa and brother Iyad Al-Salfiti. These were from the group that had separated from us and rejoined us. With them was another brother called Thabet Mardawi, and I learned later that Mardawi had been hidden and besieged for two days in a place where, if he had stayed, the army would not have discovered him and arrested him with us. Jamal Huwail and his group were not aware of our presence at first. When we identified them, we called out to them and brought them in quickly and quietly. The meeting was very touching, as if we had not met or seen each other for 20 or 30 years. We greeted them and congratulated them on their safe return.

While we were sitting, one of the brothers started crying and said that his cousin Wael Abu Al-Sabaa had been martyred a short while ago while we were coming here. We had crossed one of the streets that had been opened by the enemy, and when he tried to cross, he was struck by a sniper bullet and was martyred. We began to pray for mercy for the martyr and to calm the brother down and console him that we were all destined to take this path until liberation. We stayed in that house until the afternoon. Then we decided to separate into two cells, keen to reduce losses in case we were exposed. So I formed a group and brother Jamal Huwail formed a group. Although everyone agreed to it, the implementation was difficult and arduous for each one of us. After my group and I decided to move through a gap to a neighboring house, we found that the second group had caught up with us. We realized that separating from each other was difficult, and we agreed to stay together. We said that whatever Allah has written for us will happen, so trust in Allah. We then went down to the house of a person from the Abu Saria family, next to the house of the father of the martyr Mustafa Jablah, and also the

house of Abu Aisha, the son of Hajja Aisha. Since we were completely cut off from water and there was no gap that would lead us to those houses, we found a small window that we opened, as it was suitable to be a gap. We went to the house of Hussein Aisha, Abu Iyad. The house was burned, but one of the faucets, fortunately for us, was broken and dripping a little water, so we filled a bottle and were able to quench our thirst somewhat. After that, we thought that if we could reach the main street, we would be safe from the occupation soldiers. However, we were surprised that one of the tanks was entrenched in the middle of the street that we were supposed to cross, so we returned to the house we were in, and we were able to... It was impossible to reach the main street. Then one of the brothers, Mohammad Khalil Al-Nursi, who was later martyred, may Allah have mercy on him, suggested that we move to Abu Al-Saba'a neighborhood, and from there to the hospital road, and God willing, we will be there.

Were there any wounded with you at that moment?

Yes, there were some wounded and some civilians as well. Since our options to leave the camp were almost nonexistent, we decided to follow the suggestion of brother Mohammad Al-Nursi, who went with brother Alaa Freihat and brother Omar Sharif, so that we would not risk all of us going to explore the road and if it was safe, one of them would come back to inform us. Only five minutes after they left, we were surprised by the return of Alaa and Omar to tell us that brother Mohammad had been martyred when he tried to cross one of the streets to test his safety. He was struck by a sniper bullet and was martyred instantly. At that point, we realized that things were going from bad to worse, and that our options to leave and escape had become nonexistent. I was one of the people who called their families, and I told my wife to take care of herself, the girls, and the house, and that this might be the last call with them, and they should recite Al-Fatiha (Quranic verse) for us and pray for us. I turned off the mobile phone, and the brothers did the same. In other words, they were farewell calls.

How did your family and wife react to this call? Tell me about their reaction.

Her first response was to cry, then she said that we are believers and victory must be for you and for us, so if you do not win in this world, then the hereafter will be yours because you are martyrs, and she concluded by saying, "There is no power or strength except with Allah," and she hung up. Of course, after that, our main concern became to disappear more and more from the eyes of the occupation soldiers, so we moved to one of the houses...

During that period, you were in contact with satellite channels. Wasn't that a mistake on your part, as it might reveal your whereabouts to the enemy?

The enemy, with all their weapons, including Apache helicopters and other weapons, spared no place without striking and bombing it. They bombed everywhere indiscriminately, and there was no way to know whether contacting us was harmful or not. The satellite channels were racing to contact us to broadcast the latest

developments in the camp. Unfortunately, we felt that their main and only concern was to convey the news, not to help us. Therefore, after the killing of the 13 soldiers, we cut off contact with them because we realized that they, as satellite channels, did not help us despite all our appeals. We appealed to the Red Cross, we appealed to the United Nations, we appealed to human rights committees, we appealed to the Arab nation to take a serious stand with these people and with this camp... but unfortunately they did not do so... even ambulances could no longer reach us... I remember that Walid Al-Omari, the Al-Jazeera correspondent, called and said that he was willing to broadcast an interview with me after the killing of the 13 soldiers to narrate what happened and that he would record it because it was not possible to broadcast live before the news bulletin. I refused and said that everything we said, called for, and talked about did not help us at all, even ambulances could no longer reach us. Your only concern is racing to broadcast the news while our primary concern is to help civilians get out. We no longer ask about our own safety, and our concern is to ensure the safety of the civilians with us, including children, women, and the elderly. I refused his request and told him to leave us alone since they cannot help. He said you can say that in the interview, but I insisted on my refusal and had cut the line. The satellite channels did not help us in the actual sense. They benefited from the fact that we broadcast what was happening with us in the hope that the world would help us, but unfortunately no one helped us, even though the Arab nation and its people have capabilities that if they were placed in the trench of conflict with the Zionist entity, they would have defeated it long ago. But unfortunately, most of our Arab leaders are traitors and they are the ones who protect Israel, so how will they allow their people to support us in reality?

In the end, we praise Allah, Lord of the Worlds, for everything, and we ask Allah to count this work for His sake. Therefore, I believe that the satellite channels did not help us practically as we, as fighters, had expected and hoped.

Let us return to the last house where you were besieged...

After entering Hussein Aisha Abu Ayyad's house, we started thinking about moving to a safer house. We thought that hiding in a destroyed house would remove the danger from us, as destroyed houses are less exposed to targeting. Therefore, we moved at night to a destroyed house next to Abu Rifaat Al-Rakh's house, and we tried to reach the Al-Rakh neighborhood from there. Once again, we were surprised that the army was present in large numbers in that neighborhood. We were forced to return to the destroyed house, whose owner's name I did not know. The roof of the house was destroyed at an angle, so the brothers spread out under the rubble to ensure they were not exposed. I entered myself into a small room filled with half-buried rubble and dust. With me was brother Jamal Huwail and another young man from the Ghazzawi family and others. I told Jamal that I wanted to stretch out and sleep to rest a little and that you must remain fully awake and careful. Not long after, before I fell asleep, brother Jamal came to me and said that the ground was shaking beneath us. Because of my extreme exhaustion, I did not understand what he was saying at first, so I said, "How can the ground shake beneath us? Let me sleep a little." When he alerted me to the

seriousness of what was happening, I shook off the sleep from my eyes and actually got up and found that the bulldozer was very close to where we were and that it had gathered, in front of it, the rubble of some of the neighboring houses and was trying to push them towards the roof of the house we were in to bury us under its rubble. We withdrew as quickly as we could and at the last moment we escaped certain death and returned to the house of the Abu Saria family, the last house in which we were surrounded. That was at 1:00 AM Around ten o'clock on the eleventh day, I remember the calls to the ambulance started around twelve o'clock.

Tell us about the house... and the last siege... and how you got out?

Yes... after we entered and stayed in that house, we had a brother with us called Ibrahim Al-Damj who was injured in his shoulder, so we told him that we would try to move from here to Talal Al-Waini's house on the main street, and in order not to go all at once, we said to him: What do you think since you are injured and go down to the street with a white shirt, so if there is an army you lift up the shirt and surrender yourself and say that you are injured and no one else is there... and if there is no army there you tell us to follow you towards the main street and from there towards the hospital, all of this was at night around 11:30 PM, and indeed brother Ibrahim Al-Damj got ready and went down and when he was a short distance away from us, a soldier grabbed him. From our position we could have killed the soldier, but we were afraid that brother Ibrahim would be shot, and we were also afraid that our position would be exposed and that the enemy would locate us. We discovered later that our position was exposed, and we did not know. We were at Talal Al-Waini's house, adjacent to Abu Saria's house, to which we returned after Ibrahim Al-Damj's arrest. We had some devices with us there, and we were preserving their batteries for when necessary. At the last moment, Jamal Huwail called the ambulance driver, a young volunteer named Ghassan Al-Saadi, and told him where we were and gave him our names, and that the occupation army was besieging us and trying to bury us alive. Fate wanted it that an Al-Jazeera correspondent was next to Ghassan Al-Saadi, so he told him to speak live with Al-Jazeera. Jamal actually spoke to Al-Jazeera and told them about our situation. At that time, bulldozers began to advance towards us, and Jamal literally appealed to human rights committees and all international bodies that we were besieged and with us were civilians, and here we were, still alive, and Israel and its bulldozers were trying to bury us alive and were refusing even the surrender of these civilians trapped with us. Then we learned of the intervention of one of the human rights committees, and the world heard our appeal. We received a call from Mohammed Al-Hindi, the director of intelligence in Gaza, and Nasser Abu Aziz, one of the cadres of the Popular Front in Jenin, called. They promised Jamal that they would not allow us to be buried alive, that they would work to get us out and that we had to surrender ourselves. Jamal said that there were people who wanted to surrender and others who did not want to, and that they had to make way for that. He asked him how many were there and he said 27 people. We were actually 25, and we hoped to find some brothers here or there to take with us. After some time, Saeb Erekat called again and told us that he had made a call with Kofi Annan, the Secretary General of the United Nations, and that they were

holding talks to prevent us from being buried alive. During these minutes during the negotiations, brother Thabet Al-Mardawi headed out and I was with him, along with Iyad Al-Salfiti. There was a house that had been cut off in the middle overlooking the street. We headed towards it to survey the route we would take to reach another alley that might provide us with safety. We were surprised to find that the street we would cross was cut off by a tank at its beginning and end, and at its end, behind one of the tanks, was a bulldozer that was demolishing houses. Faced with this difficult situation and the necessity of leaving the place we were in, I suggested to the brothers that some of us climb onto the roof of the cut-off house, which was not much higher than the street, and the rest from below. We prepare to cross the street and distribute our machine gun fire on both sides towards the front to comb and cover the crossing of the street. Despite one of the brothers' opposition to the plan, and that a single tank shell would be enough to kill us all while crossing, we were determined to implement it. Some of the brothers said that you are taking us to certain death, so we told them that it is possible to stay here for those who want to surrender and they will not be harmed. While Issam Abu Al-Sabaa, three other brothers, and I were preparing to leave the place, at that moment Jamal's mobile phone rang. The caller, without me knowing who he was, said that there was urgent news reported by the media that Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah had launched an initiative to save you and preserve your lives and safety in exchange for the officer he had captured.

Then we felt very happy and reassured and decided to stay together in that house as a result of that news and we thanked Allah, Lord of the Worlds. But we asked that the negotiations not be through the [Palestinian] Authority and the caller asked why. I said that the [Palestinian] Authority has dishonest elements. The response was that the negotiations would be conducted directly with Hezbollah. So we agreed to surrender and most of the young men were in a hurry to surrender themselves and we had advised them to stall until the morning and since our position was now exposed, Apache helicopters never left the sky of the area and were illuminating the place with flares. After that, the official in charge of the Israeli campaign on the camp began calling us over loudspeakers.

Were your names known to the parties who contacted you?

Yes, at that time, all our names were with B'Tselem, the human rights committee, and the caller said he was from Umm Al-Fahm and their representative. At first, I refused to give my name, and so did brother Thabet Al-Mardawi, fearing we would be bombed. We told him if they knew our names, they would bomb us all. The representative said, "Don't be afraid, it won't happen." He asked for the names of the four most dangerous fugitives we had. Jamal gave them three names: Thabet Al-Mardawi, Ali Al-Safouri, and Alaa Freihat, while the fourth was Jamal himself.

Negotiations were taking place between brother Jamal and the official in charge of the occupation forces in the Jenin district. We were first asked to leave with our hands up after taking off all our clothes. This request was completely rejected by some of the

brothers and we said that we would rather die here than do that. I informed Jamal of the situation and that everyone was not ready to take off their clothes. The officer responded that as much as you are concerned about your safety and the safety of those with you, I am concerned about my soldiers for fear that you might be booby-trapped. After some debate and back and forth, and after Jamal confirmed that no one was booby-trapped, it was agreed that we take off our upper clothes and leave without raising our hands. Our exit will be in two stages: one to make sure that none of us are carrying weapons, and the other to go forward for inspection by the army.

At daybreak, we found ourselves surrounded from all sides by tanks and bulldozers, surrounding us from every direction and at a distance from which the soldiers could see us. We were exposed from all directions, and without exaggeration, the number of soldiers present in the area around us exceeded 20,000 soldiers. All the forces that entered the camp and surrounded it were there to watch us. We were greatly surprised when we discovered that our planning at night to escape the siege and go down to the street leading to a safe area turned out to be an army camp full of soldiers and snipers. One of the brothers commented on this by saying to me, "Sir, if we had gone out at night, our fate would have been in their arms." So I said, "This is our fate." We went out and stood on a dirt mound. The view was unimaginable. The camp no longer existed. For the first time, it was the first time we were looking and seeing the neighborhood we were in. We did not recognize the houses, even though I am a son of the camp, lived in it all my life, and knew all of its houses, but it was different and its features were different, and because of the amount of destruction, I didn't even recognize the house that they put us in while we were handcuffed. We were looking at the camp and found nothing but mountains of piled up cement and the remains of houses. At that time, we were not known to the army as figures. They started calling for us to come forward one by one. One of the soldiers was pointing an M16 rifle at the person who was approaching the officer for inspection, and after the inspection he handed him over to another soldier to pick him up and take him to another room. Thus, our exit from the camp was a real tragedy. We felt that what happened to the camp was a great tragedy after we were gathered in one room, handcuffed. They took us to the house of Abu Ali Al-Owais for another inspection. Of course, Abu Ali Al-Owais' house consisted of three floors. It was full of soldiers, and snipers were stationed on every window of the building. They took us one by one, conducted a thorough search, and made us sit on a pile of dirt and rubble on the stairs of the house of Hussein Al-Hajj Rajeh, which tanks and bulldozers had demolished. They made us sit on those rubble for about a quarter of an hour, after which we were surprised that military jeeps started advancing towards us, an officer came, the press came, and cameras started taking pictures of us.

I won't hide from you that our sight was very painful and we were very ashamed of ourselves and our heads were on the ground, to the point that brother Jamal asked me to raise my head because we hadn't done anything to be ashamed of, so I told him to trust in Allah. The situation wasn't easy, in addition to our feeling of being broken, I was hiding my face from the camera so that I wouldn't be identified. One of the brothers said to me: "Sir, be careful because one of the people in Abu Saleem's house is pointing

towards you." I said, "It's okay," and moved myself a little so that he wouldn't recognize me. After about ten minutes, they took us to the mosque. On the way to the mosque, we saw the bodies spread here and there, some covered with a broken door, some covered with blankets, and others uncovered, and of young men who had been martyred. The distance to the mosque was no more than 50 meters. When we arrived at the mosque, they blindfolded us with rags and made us stand with our faces towards the wall. After a while, one of the officers came calling Safouri, but I didn't answer. He called again, but I didn't answer because my name on the ID wasn't Safouri, but Al-Saadi. He then turned to me and said, "Aren't you Ali Al-Safouri?" I said, "I'm Ali Al-Saadi". He said, "Aren't you Hajj Ali Al-Safouri too?" I said, "Yeah." Then they took me and put me in the mosque and I began my winter and summer journey with the intelligence men and the army men in the mosque. I was blindfolded and handcuffed. I heard a young man being tortured next to me and from another direction I heard someone speaking Arabic.

He told the officer my name and Jamal Huwail's name, which made me feel a bit at ease and I said to myself that martyrdom here in the house of Allah has a special taste that is not available to many who were martyred and buried under the rubble. I was even happy that those who came to bury me would find my whole body and not pieces, and this is a consolation to me. After that, they took us out of the mosque in a single row, putting me in the front and the rest of the young men behind me. Then one of the officers came forward and removed the blindfold from my eyes and asked for my name. Four cameras had started filming, so I said, "My name is Ali Suleiman Saeed Al-Saadi." He said, "You are Hajj Ali Al-Safouri". I said, "Yeah." He said, "This is your entire army." I said "Yeah, this is my army." Then he put the blindfold back on my eyes and one of the tanks came and they took us in. We did not know where we were headed, until we arrived and I knew that we were in Salem prison, and thus our journey in the prisons began.

How true is it that the army sent you a device while you were surrounded so you could talk to it, and also that one of the officers, according to the account of the journalist Abdul-Yem Mufid (a refugee account), who is the campaign leader, saluted the fighters as they were leaving? How true is this?

There is some exaggeration in this statement. The campaign leader did not send us a device. We had our own devices and we obtained the officer's number from our brother Qadrouma Musa, since he was in the coordination committee. He said to call this number. However, the campaign leader was the one who took the initiative to contact us and that was the beginning of the negotiations. As for the officer and the fact that he saluted the fighters, we have not seen him since we left Abu Ali Al-Awis' house. Because he went to tour the camp to collect weapons and search for fighters, even though we assured him that there were no fighters left. The first question he asked us was who remained of the fighters in the camp, and we answered that there were no fighters left. He said that he had orders to bomb the camp with F16s. We said, "You can bomb with B52s." No one remained in the camp. He asked, "Where are the weapons?"

We said, "They are all still there in the camp." This was the initial investigation that took place in the camp.

The Israeli side claims that it prevented ambulances from transporting the bodies because you had booby-trapped them? And that the places and houses that were demolished contained explosive belts that you had left planted there. How true is that?

This is absolutely untrue, as the explosive belt detonates either with a push of a button or a remote control. It is unreasonable for the demolished houses to be supervised from one location. The aim of this talk is a failed attempt to justify the major crimes that took place in the camp. As for booby-trapping the bodies, how can we blow up the bodies when we know that the ones who will pick them up are young men from the Palestinian Red Crescent? In practice, the ones who come and pick up the bodies are not the Israeli army, but rather the brothers, the nurses in Jenin Hospital. So, is it possible for us to blow up a body so that it explodes on a doctor who comes to treat you? This is a false claim and incorrect talk.

Jamal Huwail's testimony / Jenin Camp

We would like you to begin by introducing yourself and telling us about your role in the events in Jenin Camp and the preparations that preceded them, in a sequential manner and day by day, if possible.

First of all, my name is Jamal Huwail, a resident of Jenin Camp. I am originally from a village called Zar'in in the Jenin district. I am a master's student in political studies at Birzeit University. I work as an economic director in the Palestinian Legislative Council and a leading member of the Fatah Youth in the West Bank. The enemy considers me one of the main wanted men in the Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades in the West Bank. What happened in Jenin Camp was a true legend that occurred as a result of the successful thinking of a group of young people in the camp who belong to all the active political forces. They came together to form the most wonderful model of national unity by discussing and overcoming the negatives and working to strengthen the positives among everyone, to be an example to be emulated throughout the length and breadth of the homeland in order to achieve our goals of freedom and independence. The Jenin area, as you know, has been known in previous historical eras as a model of resistance and defiance. From the fighter Izz Ad-Din Al-Qassam, who was stationed in this area and waged famous and great struggles until his martyrdom in the Ya'bad forests...

Through the heroic deeds of the Iraqi army and its steadfastness in the Jenin area, where a large number of them were martyred... Dozens of armed groups emerged from this area over the years of occupation, especially the Black Panther and Red Eagle groups during the First Intifada, leading up to the Al-Aqsa Intifada, and the emergence of active resistance military groups in the Jenin area, which led the enemy to admit that the number of its dead settlers and soldiers exceeded the number of martyrs in this area... The enemy also called it by several names, including the "Hornet's Nest" (or "Wasp's Nest"). In the wake of what happened in the Jenin Camp, it was considered the cornerstone of the establishment of the Palestinian state.

If we talk about the battles that took place in Jenin, they began on March 30th, not as was said on April 3rd, when the intense military buildup in the Jenin Governorate began. There was also a special martyrdom operation by the brothers in the Izz Ad-Din Al-Qassam Brigades, carried out in Haifa by the heroic fighter Shadi Al-Tubasi, and the enemy admitted to the killing of 26 or 28 Zionists. This operation made the enemy, in addition to its prior intention to storm the area, double its hatred for Jenin, especially the camp, because this area witnessed many large and continuous jihadist and struggle operations. Every time the enemy tried to storm areas in the West Bank, it failed to storm the Jenin Camp, although these matters did not receive a great media uproar as happened in the last invasion. In March, that is, about 20 days before the siege of the

camp, we repelled a major attack, 25 martyrs fell, and we prevented them from entering the camp. The success in repelling these invasions is due to the positive collective effort made by a group of field leaders, whether from Fatah or Hamas or [Islamic] Jihad, which constituted the main active forces in those battles, in addition to some comrades from the Popular and Democratic Fronts who worked as individuals or in small cells.

Can you tell us some of these fundamental names?

Yes, there are distinguished brothers in the Hamas movement who played a major role in the jihadist work in Jenin Camp, including the martyr Issa Adwan, Nasr Jarrar, Mahmoud Al-Hilweh, and Mahmoud Musa Abu Musab, all of whom were martyred. Among our brothers in Islamic Jihad, the Al-Quds Brigades, is the martyr brother Mahmoud Tawalbeh, this brother who was distinguished by the characteristics of a true leader, although he was no more than 25 years old. He also possessed the characteristics of a simple person who loved everyone and whom everyone loved. Also, brother Al-Safouri, who was considered one of the most dangerous fugitives by the enemy... and brother Bassam Al-Saadi, who is still wanted and is considered the leader of the brothers in jihad... and brother Al-Shabl Saeed Al-Tubasi, who is also still wanted. There were brothers from outside the camp with us, such as Thabet Al-Mardawi and Abdel Haleem Izz Al-Din, in addition to other brothers. As for the Fatah movement, specifically the Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades, we were a very distinguished elite in work and were the founders of the martyrdom school in Fatah, as the first martyrdom operation in the West Bank was launched from Jenin Camp and was carried out by the martyr Nazir Hammad from the village of "Al-Arqa" in the Jenin district. One of these distinguished brothers, the martyr leader brother Ziad Amer, graduated from university with an English diploma and was 27 years old. He was arrested in the First Intifada and sentenced to life imprisonment on charges of killing enemy agents. His house was blown up and he was released in the Oslo releases of 1994. Also among the well-known brothers in the Al-Aqsa Brigades in Jenin are Akram Stiti and Majdi Al-Tayeb. He was martyred inside the camp in an assassination operation after his car was rigged with explosives and detonated by a remote-controlled reconnaissance aircraft. There is also the fighter Abdel Kareem Awis, who is currently in Asqalan prison. He had survived the first assassination attempt carried out by the enemy in the Jenin area with an Apache helicopter, and the second in the West Bank, when his car was bombed near the district and he was martyred. Unfortunately, in that attempt, one of the brothers who was also known in the Al-Aqsa Brigades, named Moatasem Al-Sabbagh, was also killed. Israel accused him of being the first to work on developing mortar shells and launchers at that time. He had worked at that time with Hajj Ali Al-Safouri, who was new to the work at that time, while brother Abdel Kareem Awis was imprisoned for life in the First Intifada and was released in 1994. He was one of the founders of the Black Panther groups in the First Intifada and his house was also bombed. Among the prominent brothers are brothers Amjad Al-Fakhouri from the village of Jaba' and Amer Al-Hawatli from Silat Al-Dhahr, and in the city of Jenin, Khattab Jabareen. There are many names that I remember, including Alaa Al-Sabbagh in the Jenin Camp and the martyr Zuhair Stiti,

who was martyred in the Battle of Jenin on a raid of Burqin, where he was injured in his eyes... and brother Nidal Turkman, who was one of the very well-known young men in the Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades... and brother Zakaria Zubeidi, who are still wanted until now, in addition to Adnan Abu Na'sah and other names that I can't all remember now. In general, brother Atta Abu Rumaila was at the head of the Fatah organization in the Jenin Camp, and he was considered the undisputed head of the Jenin Camp in all confrontations, whether against the Zionist enemy or against the Palestinian Authority during the period of political arrests, as we cooperated with some brothers in other organizations. We worked mainly with brother Jamal Abu Al-Haija from Hamas, and brother Bassam Al-Saadi from [Islamic] Jihad.

We would like you to explain to us the leadership structure at the head of the camp. If we say "Fatah," do we mean the Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades?

I will start with the second part by saying that the Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades is not exactly a Fatah organization, as there is an official organizational body in the Jenin Camp, and its secretary is brother Abu Rumaila, who is responsible for all social, political, and union issues, and everything related to the citizens in the camp. He is also responsible for the social committee for services in the camp... and we supported him in his work in mobilizing the masses. As for the Brigades, I want to clarify an important issue - a brief overview of the Brigades and their formation throughout the West Bank, to be a reference for readers in the future. The Brigades did not have a central command as an option and as an approach we followed since the beginning of the events. We considered that each governorate had its own way of working and coordination could take place between one region and another, but there was no unified command in all regions. Each region had the choice of what it did, to the point that in some regions there was more than one group working under the name of the Brigades without them knowing each other. Our slogan in the Jenin region and we generalized it to the entire West Bank was... The leader is the martyr, and as long as you live, you are a soldier in the battle. The enemy tried to direct many accusations at us and described a group of us in a hierarchical order as leaders of the Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades, but this is absolutely untrue.

If we try to specify the work of the brigades in Jenin Camp, who was the primary reference for these groups and was he an organizational reference?

Essentially, the Al-Aqsa Brigades had no connection to organizational or political work. We were engaged in military resistance work in accordance with the movement's ideology and its declared political stances and orientations. We sometimes disagreed with our brothers in the organization, who would contact us in one way or another to ask us to calm down or to take some regional and international considerations into account. Despite our commitment to the general political line declared by the movement, we knew that there was more than one trend within the organization that had reached the point of confusion. Therefore, we tried to distance our military work from such matters, and our highest authority as the Brigades did not extend beyond the

camp. As for armament and financial support, it was an important and difficult matter for us... since the operations we carried out sometimes required large sums of money, even weapons costing 20-30,000 shekels. Therefore, there were some sources of income from social institutions in the area and from philanthropists who wanted to participate in the struggle with their money without anyone knowing about them. There were some other sources from organizational authorities that I cannot mention here.

But I will ask you, and you are free to answer... What is Munir Maqdah's relationship with the Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades in terms of financial support?

First of all, brother Munir Maqdah, the commander of the Fatah militia in Lebanon, is a respected man, and I hold him in the highest regard, regardless of what we have heard recently. When everyone abandoned the sons of Fatah, especially the hard core of the Fatah movement who formed the Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades, he provided us with support by all means, and in all areas of the West Bank, whether financially or otherwise. This came afterward, meaning it had nothing to do with the founding. We made it clear to him from the beginning that we are subordinate to and committed to the Fatah movement and our [Palestinian] Authority, brother Abu Ammar, and that we would not accept anything else. This was to remove any doubt. We were ambiguous about the party Munir Maqdah was working with, but we were fundamentally in need of funding.

It is said that Munir Maqdah receives money from Iran through Hezbollah. Do you have any thoughts on this matter?

Initially, I believed that everyone who helped and worked during that period was accused of such things. On the other hand, I don't know the exact truth, as we weren't close to or aware of everything Munir Maqdah was doing to determine the validity or invalidity of this talk. In any case, Munir Maqdah, in his support for us, did not impose any conditions on the young men that were in line with the Iranian or Hezbollah approach. I believe that if there was a connection to the issue, it would have become clear from the special demands and conditions that served the interests of Iran and Hezbollah, which we had to fulfill in exchange for their support. We never felt that from him. I don't know the true source of the support we received, but the important thing is that it was open and effective support.

Did the support include all Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades groups in all regions?

Yes... and I believe the support was not limited to the Brigades only, but also included the Brigades of Return, which is also affiliated with the Fatah movement. Munir Maqdah had a relationship with the youth, specifically with brother Ziad Amer, and I did some things in this context, but the basic relationship was through brother Ziad Amer, and we did not know the amount of funding that arrived, but our trust in brother Ziad Amer and the brothers who were with him made us consider that any decision they made constituted a reference for us, and the composition of the reference was either three or

five. Some of these brothers were martyred and some are still alive, and the basis of this structure, in addition to Ziad, was brother Akram Stiti and the rest of the living, there is no need to mention their names.

I would like to clarify more about the formation you mentioned, a trio or a quintet. Were they, for example, in contact with Nablus regarding military affairs?

Communication with Nablus was coordination and consultation. We exchanged views on the current situation on the ground and news of operations taking place in our area or theirs. We provided each other with data on the details of what happened and posters of the martyrs to publish and distribute in different areas regarding military cooperation. I have information that such things happened and existed between other areas such as Tulkarem, Nablus, Bethlehem, and Ramallah. Jenin, on the other hand, had its own privacy, as it was closed to everyone. No one from the other areas was there... but there were young men who were present in Nablus, and likewise there were young men from Tulkarem in Ramallah and young men from Jenin in Ramallah, but not the other way around, like Abdel Kareem Awis, who is one of the members of the five-member group I mentioned, and he carried out special activities and operations from Ramallah.

Regarding experience, did you exchange experience and military experience as a cumulative experience?

Of course, these matters existed, but they were consultative and non-binding, and in the end, the decision rests with the groups in each region individually.

During the Intifada, we noticed two political discourses: that of the official Palestinian Authority (PA), the Fatah movement, and that of the Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades. How did you deal with this duality? What did you do to bridge the gap between the two positions?

As I said before, the confusion that has gripped the political situation at the leadership level has negatively impacted the work of some of our brothers in the military apparatus. Therefore, we had to adopt military work as a fixed method until a clear political horizon appeared to stop military work. There is Al-Quds, settlements, withdrawals and other matters. Of course, with all due respect and appreciation for the highest authority of the organization in the West Bank, represented by brother Marwan Barghouti, who is primarily considered a symbol of the Intifada. This is acknowledged by the enemy before the ally. We respected his opinion and decision, and at the same time we affirmed that we were not in contact with him on the subject of military work. Although some brothers acknowledged him, I rule out and am surprised that brother Barghouti would be involved in matters like this. Despite our distance from the issue of Jenin Camp, it is important to know and say here that brother Marwan supported, but not the military apparatus. Since I was responsible for the Fatah Youth in Jenin Camp and a member of the Youth leadership in the West Bank, it was natural for brother

Marwan to support me. My own budget reached me through him in his capacity as Secretary of the Fatah Movement in the West Bank. As for me, I was disposing of this budget to serve military work. Marwan had nothing to do with that. I believe this is what happened with Marwan in more than one place, but the brothers in the investigation and in facing the questions of the intelligence men and investigators and their various methods and the answers that were given and the closeness between them enabled the investigators to trap some of the brothers in the subject of brother Marwan and his relationship to military work, as Israel was interested in any way to hold brother Marwan responsible for leading the military apparatus and the Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades in the West Bank.

I challenge, and I am responsible for my words, that brother Marwan or anyone else is responsible for the Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades, and it is possible to confirm this statement in a future meeting, and I considered - and I spoke about it in a press interview with Al-Istiqlal magazine, affiliated with Islamic Jihad since the beginning of our military work, that the secret of our success in the Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades militarily is due to the lack of a single organizational structure and a single reference in all areas in the West Bank. Of course, this had negative aspects represented by the lack of a reference that controlled our work in a single direction. However, the success was greater in terms of confusing the enemy and his inability to strike large groups just because of a small mistake or a small blow. For example, with the brothers in Hamas or Islamic Jihad, if they struck a military group in Nablus, this strike would extend to include individuals and circles in the rest of the areas of Jenin, Tulkarem, Qalqilya, and others. Their structure was hierarchical; if one of them was arrested and collapsed during interrogation, he would confess about the entire organizational hierarchy. This happened with our brothers in the Al-Quds Brigades, but within the Fatah movement, things were different. For example, I don't know anyone in Nablus, and if I did know someone, he would be wanted, like Nasser Awis or Raed Karmi. And if they recognized me, it was the same because I was wanted. The biggest surprise for the youth when I entered prison and went to Megiddo was that I was not responsible for many of the charges attributed to me. The youth wrongly assumed that I was responsible because the Israeli media, Al-Jazeera, and Abu Dhabi stations were advertising me in a different way. In the reports they broadcasted and the interviews I conducted, they gave us big names and titles that I had nothing to do with. During the investigation, it became clear that I had no connection to many things, and this was admitted by the enemy on their website called I.D.F., which belongs to the Ministry of Defense. It stated that after the investigation, it became clear to them that some people had no connection to "terrorist" acts that they were accused of, such as Jamal Huwail. However, at the beginning of my arrest, Ben-Eliezer said, "It is sufficient that we eliminated Qais Adwan and Mahmoud Tawalbeh and arrested Jamal Huwail and Hajj Ali Al-Safouri." They then held me responsible for more than 150 operations, but the investigation showed that I had no connection to any of them.

After you confirmed that the success of your military operation was due to the lack of a unified authority and thus the difficulty of being attacked by the occupation forces, and that in every region you have become "independent" as groups of the Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades in performing your military duties... now, two years after the Intifada, have you considered the prospects of your military operation and its political outcomes?

No... I mentioned to you that our thinking went in the direction of purely military work until a political solution appeared on the horizon that would lead us to stop our military work, which made us not commit to partial solutions that the enemy did not commit to. For example, they would ask us for a complete ceasefire and that there were efforts, etc., and the next day we find that the enemy assassinated one of the leaders or wanted fighters or besieged the president and bombed his headquarters. Therefore, we began to estimate that the leadership wanted us to respond to that, and to strike hard and wherever it was. But if we come to talk about the current stage, we find that there is a re-study and re-evaluation by all organizations of the method of work, and this applies to the Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades as it is part of the political and social fabric of our people, and its calculations in work must be re-evaluated.

In the context of reassessments, and given that the Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades launched martyrdom operations from the Jenin Camp, as I mentioned earlier, and looking back, would continuing martyrdom operations inside the country have been a positive or negative consideration? Especially given the political stalemate, I hope you'll share your personal position.

First of all, it is difficult to separate the official position from the personal position when you are in a position of responsibility, but despite that, I will try and be frank with you, even about my personal position. They were asking us to stop killing civilians and not to carry out operations inside Israel. In contrast, we see the Israeli army invaded the Jenin Camp more than 10 times, besieging the camp and the city of Jenin with tanks, while children, women, and the elderly are being killed, and the list of martyrs in the camp is long. All these things generate a response from all the youth of the camp who see all these atrocities and crimes. When you ask me not to kill civilians and I see the army besieging me and preventing everything and killing innocent people, what should I do to stop that other than the balance of terror created by the martyrdom operations inside Israel, which aimed to mobilize the Israeli street to pressure towards stopping the massacres against us by the army. But what happened is that the whole world after 9/11 began to see every operation we carried out as an unacceptable terrorist act, because they were not aware of the reality of what was happening here. Therefore, it was necessary to reconsider and recalculate the work and it was necessary to continue the work and limit it to the areas occupied in 1967, but in the event that the enemy carries out a brutal act against civilians, it is necessary to respond to it to deter it inside Israel and wherever it may be.

Even at this stage?

Yes, even at this stage.

The question now is about the martyrdom operations and the phrase "taking revenge" and retaliation, which was repeated many times during the testimonies of other brothers. It was even said that the brothers in Hamas removed some of the leaders from the camp to remain abroad with the aim of taking revenge and retaliating. Don't you think that military work with this understanding has turned into a case of personal revenge and retaliation instead of having a political goal?

Yes, that's true. And I think it hurt us. But if we look at it in a simplified way... Will revenge achieve greater success for us than what Israel might achieve through such operations? Yes, we used to ask ourselves such questions. I tell you, we in the camp were a group of young men who talked and agreed on a certain thing. Since there is not a house in the camp without a martyr, wounded person, or prisoner, we used to say to each other, as a kind of incentive, that even if it is for the sake of personal revenge, we must continue our work. Of course, this basic motive is not revenge, but rather liberating the land and defeating the occupation. If there had been no occupation, there would have been no revenge. If there had been no settlements and settlers, there would have been no revenge. If we had obtained our rights, the revenge would have ended. In the First Intifada, one of my brothers was martyred. After a while, peace negotiations began. I did not think at the time of taking revenge for my brother and all the martyrs, in order to satisfy my conscience, my people, and my religion. But in the end, and I said this to more than one Israeli newspaper while I was outside prison, we must study the fundamental reasons that produced this apparent situation, which is also unique and has steadfastness and defiance.

It is clear to us that the existence of the occupation and its goals give us the full right to resist and struggle against it. However, in this context, you as a field leadership, and in light of the existence of two political discourses, and consequently the lack of investment in your military work... Haven't you, as the leadership of the military work in the Fatah movement, tried with the political leadership to unify the political discourse, and consequently also invest in your military work, and not just ask you to cease fire or stop work?

Naturally, the answer would be yes, especially since such contacts and consultations were conducted with the factions opposing the [Palestinian] Authority, let alone the sons of Fatah and the Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades. But the depth of confusion, as I mentioned to you, within the political leadership prevented us from achieving any success. They were unaware of what they wanted. One day they wanted military work and the next day the opposite. Nothing was clear in their thinking. There were also mistakes in the work of the Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades, Islamic Jihad, and Hamas, some of which were fatal. The work was not always successful and contributed to the clarity

of the political vision and the definition of our aspirations. Among these mistakes was that some of the brothers timed some of their operations to coincide with the presence of political figures and international envoys to the region, believing that such operations would send messages to these countries to pressure Israel to end the occupation, as it was the cause of these operations. However, Israel was immediately preparing visits to these officials at the sites of the operations, as it did with Tenet, Fisher, Mitchell, and Powell. In doing so, it was able to extract positions against us from these people, and consequently from their countries. I believe that the harm was clear to everyone.

Did you discuss such matters at the time?

Yes, but the conditions of resistance work are not always favorable at all times and places, and the timing of visits by these figures to the region cannot be subject to this technical issue. In addition to this, there are differences and a lack of commitment by a number of brothers to instructions and directives. To be more frank, sometimes the competition in the work became intense, and despite the positive nature of competition in jihadist and struggle work, sometimes it turns negative. Many operations failed due to haste and the lack of full preparation for them as a result of competition that was not in its place.

Don't you think the rivalry has been harmful in two ways? First, the quick announcement of operations and their perpetrators poses a security threat to that group...and second, it instills a sectarian spirit among members of the resistance factions. What do you say to that? And what have you done to overcome it?

First, on the issue of the security threat and exposing individuals as a result of rushing to announce it. This was one of the most important mistakes we made during the Al-Aqsa Intifada...and it was a very big and fatal mistake. As for the second mistake, after the Fatah Executive Committee evaluated the positives that happened and studied the negatives, I give the national relationship, with a little exaggeration, a mark of 80-90%, but some of the brothers evaluate the matter emotionally and say that the national relationship was 100% successful, while this is not true... I believe that the national unity in Jenin was somewhat not deeply rooted and continuous, and this was throughout the events.

Isn't the siege period an exception to this generalization?

Yes... Allah says that on the Day of Judgment everyone will be naked and no one should look at the private parts of another... So how about during the siege when everyone is exposed to death. Despite this, some sectarian statements were issued by individuals and officials outside the camp, speaking in the name of the resistance... That so-and-so is an official in Fatah, so-and-so is an official in Hamas, and another in [Islamic] Jihad. These statements continued after the siege. During the battle in which about 67 brothers, sisters, and sons were martyred, we didn't think about what to write on their

posters... Fatah, [Islamic] Jihad, or Hamas. After the battle, major mistakes were made by the leaders of the factions, namely statements here and there claiming responsibility for the killing of soldiers in the camp and attributing it to themselves. This behavior was issued by everyone, whether Fatah, [Islamic] Jihad, or Hamas. In order not to be unfair, and since I know who did these things, I say that the one who did them has absolutely nothing to do with the fighters. They mentioned the names of some brothers as being responsible for the killing of the soldiers, at a time when these brothers were martyred before the operation. They distributed the martyrs, one for [Islamic] Jihad, another for Fatah, and another for Hamas... Instead of announcing our unity and solidarity after this wonderful epic written by the people and fighters of Jenin Camp, which the world witnessed, some ended up issuing sectarian statements. Hamas, Fatah, and Islamic Jihad spoke as if there were no others besides them... I remember that the comrades in the Democratic Front had a very big role, and they are just one group, and they proved their worth in the position they were in inside the camp. The same goes for the comrades of the Popular Front, who are now imprisoned. They had a very wonderful role, and I have all respect for them.

Is it possible to mention some names from these groups?

I don't think it's right to mention it at this stage... but I give the big and decisive role in the battle to Abu Al-Jandal... and anyone who mentions the Battle of Jenin Camp without mentioning Abu Al-Jandal would be unjust and unfair... also the field commander, the martyr brother Ziad Al-Amer who was martyred on the second day of the battle. Brother Ziad was the founder of the school of opening passages from house to house, which the enemy used in Balata Camp. He also issued instructions to snipe not through windows but from special "windows" for that. He was a very persistent person who did not sleep and would wander around and inspect all the sites and axes in the camp. As for brother Abu Al-Jandal and the special unit in the National Security that was distributed throughout the camp, they played a big role which we will detail later.

Brother Mahmoud Tawalbeh, may Allah have mercy on him, played a distinguished role in booby-trapping alleys, pipes, and faucets. This was a very innovative method, as the pipes and faucets extending along the camp walls were booby-trapped. The soldiers thought they were water pipes, and it was natural for them to approach them without caution because they needed the walls to protect themselves. Then they were blown up, and they were usually at head level, the head of the soldier who was protecting himself against the wall. Brother Mahmoud Al-Hilweh from Hamas also played a major role. The cubs also played a major role, as did the role of ordinary young men who surprised us with their capabilities and readiness. There was also a role for ordinary young men working in the security services, but they excelled in their work. I remember among them Hajj Imad Al-Qassem, a First Lieutenant in the police, who is currently detained in Megiddo and whose hand was amputated. Brother Nidal Al-Nubani and his brother Shadi, who participated in killing the 13 soldiers with Amjad Al-Fayed and Mohammed Al-Fayed.

I want you to come back in more detail about the preparations you made before the last invasion, and the chronological sequence of events. We also want you to tell us about the role of the Palestinian Authority, as there was talk about contacts that took place with some brothers and forces in order to withdraw.

Of course, the preparations that were in place before the last invasion were a result of the repeated invasions that Jenin Camp was exposed to, as I mentioned before. But this time the preparation was special, because we estimated in advance that this aggressive operation would be different from the previous ones, so our preparation was greater in terms of quantity and quality than the previous invasions. A coordination meeting was held by all the organizations that included all three main factions in the camp: Fatah, Hamas, and Islamic Jihad, and there were some brothers from the Palestinian National Authority. This was approximately three days before the invasion. The situation was studied and how to develop work mechanisms in the camp to confront the coming siege and discuss the question of whether we should leave the camp or not. The truth is that we met for this matter with one of the senior leaders of the brothers in the Hamas movement and we talked about this subject and our response in the Fatah movement - Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades was that it was resistance until martyrdom because we considered this battle to be or not to be, a battle of defiance and a battle of victory. At the same time, and frankly, the siege of brother Abu Ammar in Ramallah and his betting on Jenin and the Casbah neighborhood in Nablus in particular, to persevere and resist, gave us a great impetus to continue and resist inside the camp.

Is it possible to mention the names of the faction leaders who attended the preparatory meeting?

Yes, I remember that among those who attended the meeting were brother Atta Abu Rumaila from the Fatah movement, and I was present, as were brother Ibrahim Jabr, Jamal Abu Al-Haija, Bassam Al-Ragheb, and as I remember, Bassam Al-Saadi from Islamic Jihad. There was also brother Ziad Amer from the Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades. There was Abdel Haleem Izz Al-Din from [Islamic] Jihad, Ahmed Moussa from Hamas, and of course brother Abu Al-Jandal, the undisputed commander of the Jenin Battle, and the commander of the operations room by everyone's admission. Whatever we decided, the wanted brothers who attended the meeting received it and prepared for it. They were like those responsible for the military wings, informing us of their preparations, capabilities, and the young men present. We, in turn, fully informed the factions and kept them informed. In general, the discussion in the aforementioned meeting dealt with the issue of preparing to face a very strong battle, and we did not discuss the issue of leaving the camp or not, as this issue had been decided from the beginning.

What were the specific key points you discussed at the meeting?

We discussed the issue of preparing for battle, the deployment of groups in specific locations, and the distribution of the capabilities available to the factions, whether weapons, explosives, etc. The issue of the mobile hospital was studied, as was the issue of providing a fire engine, and the issue of the nurses and doctors present in the camp.

Were such needs provided for?

Frankly, it was incomplete. There were one or two clinics, as I recall, and a number of first aid kits were available to some brothers who had completed first aid courses we used to give in Jenin Camp. In my opinion, they were more important than those who were carrying weapons sometimes because they saved brothers despite the limited resources... As for the fire department, we were promised by donor brothers inside, under the supervision and follow-up of brother Abdel Razzaq Abu Al-Haija, to provide a number of them, but they did not reach us in time.

Was the issue of leaving the camp seriously raised during the meeting?

No, it was not raised at all in the meeting, but it was discussed in side conversations with some brothers, but in the end there was a consensus on staying.

We have learned of contacts between you and some parties, including opposition groups, regarding the issue of leaving the camp.

Yes, contacts were made, and I personally discussed this matter with Jamal Abu Al-Haija one night before the invasion. He spoke to me with complete frankness and responsibility about the feasibility and reasonableness of all of us being inside the camp, and thus eliminating our cadres. My response was that our remaining was the greatest message to the people that your sons were not the only ones being sent to be martyred in Afula and Haifa, but that we, as responsible and leading young men in this camp, must also bear the responsibility and prove to the people that we are also equally prepared to sacrifice with their sons. Therefore, the decision to remain steadfast was made from two angles: the necessity of challenging Israeli arrogance... brother Abu Ammar's bet on the steadfastness of Jenin Camp and that it would become a legend... and the very high morale inside the camp, and the insistence of the military leaders to remain in the camp... There were some cases of [people] leaving the camp. I convinced Jamal Abu Al-Haija to leave first, as he was injured in the previous invasion and his hand was amputated, and his assistance to us from outside the camp would be greater. Thus, the commitment of the brothers in Hamas as an apparatus was convinced, as it was greater than the other apparatuses... For example, when brother Tawalbeh and Hajj Ali Al-Safouri were asked by Dr. Ramadan Shallah to leave the camp or for some of them and the military apparatus, such as Thabet Al-Mardawi, to leave, they completely refused to leave. In the Fatah movement, all the fugitives refused to leave.

I return to my question again about which of the political leaders in the Fatah movement asked you to leave and avoid what would happen and provided you with justifications for this position?

I will be frank with you, our brother, the leader Marwan Barghouti, called me and explained the situation to us from his informed position and said verbatim that this phase is a phase of invasions that will continue for one to three months... a phase of arrests, eliminations, demolition, and destruction of the infrastructure of the Intifada. He said this is confirmed intelligence information from the other side and therefore you must protect yourselves as much as possible and remain present for the next phase as young members of the Fatah movement and not as military forces. There was also a call from brother Jibril Rajoub and he also presented his vision on the issue. In this context, I believe, with the utmost responsibility, that Jibril Rajoub's action at this specific point and within the givens at the time was correct regarding the issue of the security headquarters in Beitunia and his request for the young men to surrender themselves. However, the fundamental mistake was the presence of wanted Hamas young men inside the headquarters in the first place, and they were supposed to be released before the Israeli forces approached the headquarters. However, I believe that something happened that we cannot understand now because there were promises and pressures from the Americans not to storm the headquarters, but they stormed it anyway.

Were you all asked to leave the camp?

No, he specifically requested the release of known wanted persons.

As we know, Jenin is a mountainous area with a vast countryside. Wasn't there any discussion or even thought about avoiding confrontation from within the camp and going out to the countryside so you could continue and sustain the resistance, and avoid a major blow to the camp and yourselves?

From our experience in previous invasions, we have the idea that the safest place for fighters is inside Jenin Camp, and we have examples that affirm this idea. In one of the previous invasions, there was a wanted "very dangerous" man from the Al-Quds Brigades who was permanently present in the camp, named Mohammad Al-Anini. When he decided to leave the camp for one reason or another and moved to the village of Saris there, the enemy was able to assassinate him during the invasion. There is another example that affirms that outside the camp was not safe or less dangerous. What happened to our brother Qais Adwan, the leader of the Al-Qassam Brigades, and the group that was with him, when he left the camp and headed to the village of Tubas, three days after the invasion, he was martyred there. Therefore, we had no choice but to hold out in Jenin Camp because leaving it was dangerous.

Tell us about the level of preparedness of the Palestinian Authority security forces in the Jenin district in general and the camp in particular, whether in terms of providing weapons and ammunition to the fighters, or regarding the decision to confront them. My question comes in light of the promises made by these forces up until the last minute to provide weapons and ammunition, but at the last minute it was said that the weapons and ammunition were transferred to a nearby village.

In general, the security services did not have a strategic plan for confrontation. They did not raise the slogan of resistance at all. A Brigadier General in the service completely moved his weapons out of the area. There is an intelligence officer who completely buried his weapons. Also, a senior official in the Jenin Governorate used to say that we are a group of madmen who want to face a battle of this kind. He kept repeating his wish to destroy the camp completely. I am responsible for these words.

Why do you think he had such an attitude?

Apparently, the national work exposed many corrupt individuals in the Palestinian Authority... and this was a major demand of our youth in the Intifada, which was reform of the [Palestinian] Authority's apparatuses and an end to the phenomenon of corruption. By everyone's consensus, this official was an agent of the Jordanian regime, and he is the worst example in his family, without forgetting that some individuals from this family played a major and honorable role in the events, and contributed greatly to the development of work... I remember among them one of the very wonderful brothers with the rank of colonel. As for another official (5), he did not participate in any confrontation, and more than that, he mocked our actions, calling them fireworks and asking mockingly, "Do you want a confrontation with these weapons and these fireworks?" This indicates that his mentality was not that of a fighter who wants a confrontation, and therefore his apparatus did not officially participate in the resistance. He left the choice to the participating elements and defending the area, and whoever did not want to could go in their civilian clothes and hide in their village. There was some individual participation from policemen here and there. Ultimately, their work was adopted by the police force as if it were a decision-making body. I personally remember First Lieutenant Imad Qasim, who was injured and had his hand amputated, among the participants.

So you affirm that there was no official decision to confront?

Yes, I affirm that, as I mentioned. As for our brothers in other agencies, such as the Preventive Security, they participated by providing us with some weapons, which we distributed to the youth. Some elements also participated effectively, but personally and

5 - We decided to keep the name of the agency and not publish the names of the officers mentioned in order to avoid legal problems and because we do not want to engage in personal discussions, "citizen".

not by decision of the resistance apparatus. In the Intelligence Service, there was an Executive Force unit present inside the camp, headed by the martyr hero, captain Mohammad Al-Nursi, who was martyred in the battle, along with his entire group. The unit that was well trained and played a major role in the camp was the Implementation and Reconnaissance Unit affiliated with National Security, headed by Abu Al-Jandal, and numbering 40 fighters. It is the only unit that fought officially, and the heads of the 17th Apparatus, and literally, Brother Abu Al-Awad and Brigadier General Faisal Abu Sharkh (Abu Mahmoud), the official of the 17th [Apparatus] in the West Bank, said, "Brother Jamal, consider me a soldier in the Battle of Jenin, and the apparatus, its director, and all its capabilities are at your disposal." Unfortunately, the aforementioned colonel in the 17th Force (6), the official in Jenin Camp, did not cooperate with us on this issue. I asked him for ammunition, but he denied having any. The young men found out where the ammunition was, went to it, broke down the doors, took out the ammunition, and transported it to Jenin Camp.

You mentioned previously that some officials in the services returned to you weapons that they had previously confiscated. Could you clarify this for us?

Yes, this happened. I mainly remember that we had a machine gun that was with the police and it was returned. There was another machine gun for Islamic Jihad that was confiscated by the National Security. I personally went to Brigadier General Fayez Arafat and he gave it to me. I believe this happened four days before the battle. This was not a personal contribution to the battle as much as it was a result of the great popular pressure at that time. The weapon was transferred to the camp and is still in the possession of the youth to this day.

Were you practically ready for battle at this stage?

Yes, in addition to that, we secured food supplies. We informed all the shops and stores in the camp to fulfill any fighter's request and record it so that accounting and payment could be done after the battle. Thus, supplies were secure in all locations.

After this preparation, can you tell us about the first stage of the siege and confrontation?

On the first day, after the young men had completed their preparations, an attempt was made to storm the camp from the southern entrance, around 2 or 3 AM, from the Al-Jabriyat area. The fighters had set up a very large ambush there, and the enemy was surprised by the young men's presence on that high ground. A very strong confrontation took place, and some soldiers were killed and wounded in that battle. Helicopters were seen evacuating the wounded from the area. During the night, the entire street was booby-trapped in the square area on the main street, in addition to booby-trapping some houses and pipes on the walls. There were also large explosive

devices that the young men called "ghosts," ranging in length from 2 to 6 meters. They were made by some of the brothers in the Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades, and were distributed in the streets.

There were also large water heaters planted and they were made by brother Mahmoud Tawalbeh. There were hand grenades made by all the organizations... Some of the manufacturing was done in coordination with Islamic Jihad and Fatah and we shared the costs. The groups were distributed around the camp and some of the groups included members of the National Security because they had experience. On the second day, if I remember correctly, the attack was concentrated from the western part of the camp. It was a very heavy invasion, and brother Abu Al-Jandal was there confronting them and he of course moved between the axes. The battle was very intense to the point that the screams of the soldiers were heard over the loudspeakers as they were begging for help from Mahmoud Tawalbeh whose house was opposite the site of the clash. They asked to be saved because they had nothing to do with this war. The young men asked them to lay down their weapons and they would be safe, and if they did not, they would die in the meantime. Brother Abu Al-Jandal contacted brother Mahmoud Tawalbeh and asked him to support him with some fighters. Indeed, the martyr Mohammad Al-Nursi, the martyr Mahmoud Tawalbeh and some of the brothers went there. Brother Mahmoud was slightly injured in his hand that day, and this battle, as I remember, was documented in pictures. Where a number of soldiers were killed and others were wounded.

On the third day, brother Tariq Darawsheh, a resident of Wadi Al-Far'a, was martyred. Brother Abu Al-Jandal swore to him that he would not leave the battle before taking revenge, and that is what he did, as he responded in kind... On the third and fourth day, approximately, the western area was completely burned as a result of the missile bombardment that continued day and night as a cover for the besieged soldiers. During this, five brothers were martyred, among whom I remember the hero Nidal Sweitat, the hero Mustafa Al-Shalabi, the hero Mohammad Talib from Nuris, and others from the National Security whose names I do not remember. After that, the groups withdrew a little towards the center of the camp, Al-Hawashin area. Among those who withdrew were Abu Al-Jandal, his group, and the rest of the brothers. After that, the attack was concentrated in the square area, and of course there was very fierce resistance as it was a key area. The tanks, under heavy fire cover from aircraft and continuous shelling, were able to advance to the square area. The camp was attacked on the fourth and fifth day, I think, from the eastern area. In the first four or five days, the young men were still lighting fires at night in the middle of the main street and gathering around them. The first rains started to fall, so they started cheering and chanting, anticipating the rain. The brothers had handheld headphones that were placed on one of their jeeps because we expected the mosque loudspeakers to be hit and the electricity to be cut off. We had a backup generator to charge the batteries of cell phones during the power outage in the camp.

Ziad Amer was martyred on the second day of the invasion, at midday, when he was shot by a sniper during a raid on the camp, called the Qanbar Raid. One of the brothers tried to save him, but he was also martyred. Brother Ziad Amer, as I said, was one of the people who played a major role in the very extensive preparation and readiness for this battle. He was a creative person in his ideas, and his mere presence in the camp represented a very important moral factor. Therefore, his martyrdom had a negative impact on the morale of some of the young men in the battle.

Tell us about your relationship as fighters with the camp's masses. Did you ask them to stay? And how long did they stay with you?

The people in the camp held out with us tremendously until the sixth or seventh day, when we asked them to leave. That's when the bulldozers started demolishing the houses and advancing slowly from house to house. The planes were bombing the houses terribly. There wasn't a house that contained a fighter or a group of fighters that wasn't bombed, with at least 30 missiles.

Were the camp residents staying voluntarily or at your request?

At first we asked people to stay and urged them to stand firm with us. But when we felt that the enemy's crimes threatened everyone without exception, and that very heinous crimes might be committed against our people, especially since the Israelis did not take into account the presence of civilians and did not differentiate between civilians and soldiers, and civilians were targeted to the same degree... We received news on the second and third day of the invasion about the execution of some young men in front of their families in the main square of the camp, even though they had no connection to any [resistance] activity. The young man was arrested and eliminated in front of his family.

The Israelis say they were forced to kill civilians because you were present as fighters in the same place. What is your response to this claim?

This justification is not uncommon for our Israeli enemy, who always finds flimsy arguments and justifications to justify its crimes. Many of the assassinations they carried out were primarily carried out by helicopters against wanted individuals, killing civilians who were nearby. As usual, they offered false apologies. These are weak justifications.

We were never in inhabited houses. Most of the time we were in the alleys of the camp. Whenever a fighter needed some rest and food, he would go to his house if it was nearby. We are residents of the camp and we defend it and its people. But the crimes committed by the enemy against the residents led the resistance fighters to ask the residents to leave their homes and save themselves in order to avoid more casualties.

I want you to tell us about seeing people buried alive under the rubble and to mention their names.

In truth, things like this happened and some brothers were buried alive. I remember the names of the martyr Mohammad Al-Badawi, who was wounded on the third day. I also remember other wounded people who were buried under the bulldozers' demolition of houses, including brother Mahmoud Al-Hilweh, brother Munir Al-Washahi, and Umm Marwan Al-Washahi. These three had their houses swept away while they were still alive inside. Houses were demolished over the bodies of martyrs, such as the body of the martyr Nidal Al-Nubani, Mohammed Al-Fayed, and Allam Kaniri, in addition to Taha Al-Zubeidi and the other brothers.

The brothers were entrenched in several locations. Hajj Ali was in the square area, and I should remember him fondly because he showed remarkable resilience. He did not move for a single moment from the spot he was in, despite the heavy missile bombardment and the large forces present in the area. On the sixth day, the Al-Damj neighborhood in the southeast of the camp was bulldozed, and some brothers were wounded and martyred there. We were there with a group of young men, me and brother Mahmoud Tawalbeh, and there was also Saeed Al-Tubasi, who is currently wanted abroad. There were other brothers, such as the martyr Mahmoud Al-Hilweh, Professor Mohammad Kharwish, and Abdel Haleem Izz Al-Din. We were in one of the houses, and then we were distributed to more than one place, because the enemy was getting closer and closer to us, and we were afraid of the bulldozers. On the fifth day, specifically, the martyr Tawalbeh went to the house of brother Jawad Al-Hasani, and there he met about five of the remaining brothers who were fortified in the place to defend the eastern area of the Al-Hawashin neighborhood. This area was bombed intensively with RPGs, and Tawalbeh, Abdul Satar, and Shadi Al-Nubani were martyred there, if I remember correctly. Hajj Imad Al-Qassem was injured and his hand was amputated. One of the brothers, named Iyad Tahseen, from Hamas, remained trapped under the rubble in the stairwell from the sixth day until the thirteenth or fifteenth day, that is, even after the withdrawal of the army from the area... According to rescuers, he had burns on his face and was able to survive thanks to pieces of cheese and a bottle of water... He recounted the martyrdom of Tawalbeh, whom he knew, and brother Tawalbeh was martyred on the sixth day of the battle.

We learned that what happened was documented with photos, and that the martyr had a camera with him during and throughout the battles. This is what some of the brothers mentioned. Did you actually record that?

The truth is, this topic came about based on our experience from previous invasions. I remember that we discussed with brother Abu Al-Jandal at length how to document and record everything. I spoke with Hajj Ali and Sheikh Jamal about how, after every battle, we would issue a joint statement of the battles and record its details and the losses of both sides. Abu Al-Jandal would record some of the events and dates. I would also record some days in a small notebook that I always had with me, but unfortunately it was lost during the invasion and I could not find it. Hajj Ali had a camera and he would film and sometimes give it to some young men to film some very important matters. I believe that the tapes exist and will one day be published.

Do you think that what Abu Al-Jandal wrote and recorded of dates and events remained with him?

I think it stayed with him until his martyrdom, and maybe the Israelis took it after that.

Why did you become interested in blogging and photography?

Based on our previous experiences, we felt that this time would be different, and that a legend would be written in these battles.

There is talk of a commitment from you in the Jenin Camp, as Fatah and other factions, of which you were aware. This commitment was expressed in a paper sent to Abu Ammar before the last invasion. Tell us about this paper in which you said that you would not carry out military operations inside the Green Line.

The leadership focused on Jenin Camp in this regard as the center of action and the axis of military operations inside the Green Line. We were contacted in this regard through a main interlocutor in his organizational capacity in the Fatah movement, not in a military capacity or any other way. This interlocutor was Marwan Barghouti. Others also contacted us for the same purpose. However, when Marwan contacted President Abu Ammar in his office, he asked us for a paper in which the factions pledged not to carry out any operations inside the Green Line, and not to claim responsibility for any such operation. Indeed, there was a great and clear understanding from the military apparatuses of the factions, mainly from the Al-Quds Brigades, as at that time Mahmoud Tawalbeh was imprisoned by the [Palestinian] Authority in Nablus, and Ali Al-Safouri was in Jenin Camp. Hajj Ali and I continued to stay up and discuss until 2:30 AM until Hajj Ali wrote a paper in his own handwriting pledging that the Al-Quds Brigades in Jenin would not carry out or claim any operations inside the Green Line. I remember that we looked for the Saraya seal but did not find it. We told Marwan that we did not find the seal and therefore the paper would not be signed with the Saraya seal. He said, "It's okay, send it to me." So we sent it, as I remember, from the National Security Office in Jenin. Marwan received it in Ramallah and went to the President at three in the morning while he was asleep. He looked at it and expressed his great satisfaction with the understanding we had shown in Jenin.

What I understand is that Marwan, in his conversation with you, expressed a position rejecting action within the Green Line, and that is why he asked you what he asked through the President.

Marwan doesn't tell anyone to work or not to work in this or that area. Marwan's position was well-known: as long as there is an occupation, there will be resistance to that occupation. But at that particular time, and in light of the political situation and the movements, his position was that we should make such a pledge.

When did this contact occur to you? Approximately which month?

I think in January or February, that is, some time before the last invasion.

Which factions did you meet with to convey Abu Ammar's message?

At that time, I had intensive meetings with Sheikh Jamal from Hamas, as I had a close relationship with him (Jamal Abu Al-Haija) in his capacity as a representative of the political wing, and with Ibrahim Jabr, Bassam Al-Saadi, Hajj Ali Al-Safouri, Abdel Haleem Izz Al-Din, and from Fatah, brother Atta Abu Rumaila, and I was up to date with brother Ziad Amer.

In practice, no pledge was made except by the Al-Quds Brigades.

The correct thing is that the Al-Quds Brigades pledged to only commit to these operations within the Jenin district, and Ali Al-Safouri said he would not abide by this agreement if Israel violated the ceasefire and directly assassinated someone, I don't remember exactly who. This did not help us complete the dialogue with our brothers in Hamas, despite an initial discussion that took place and they showed great understanding... It is true that the pledge relates to the forces present inside the camp, but the entire Jenin Camp decides its position. Brother Qadura Musa, in his capacity as Secretary of the Fatah Movement in the Jenin district, agrees with us completely, and he always said, "Whatever you agree on, I am with you and committed to it."

How did you play this dual role? On the one hand, you, as the Fatah movement, or more accurately, the Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades, were carrying out operations inside the Green Line, and on the other hand, you were required to convince the factions to issue a pledge, as you mentioned... The question is, did you adopt this position before and also submit a pledge to President Arafat?

First, when we speak with brother Marwan or the President, I speak in my organizational capacity, not as a military body. I am an official in the Fatah Youth, following up on students at universities and international relations. However, the Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades understood the political circumstances and appreciated the situation, even without dialogue. Implicitly and without submitting a written document, they were committed to the movement's general position. At the same time, they could not submit anything in writing because it would put the Fatah movement in an embarrassing situation, as there was a debate about whether the Brigades were legitimate or illegitimate. This issue was brought up to the President to remove the Brigades from legitimacy. As I recall, Hakam Balawi demanded the dissolution of the Brigades. Brother Marwan's response in this meeting was that the Brigades were not formed by a decision from the Fatah movement, and therefore they cannot be dissolved by a decision. We did not form them together, you and I (the speech is directed at Hakam Balawi) in order to dissolve them. The Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades were not formed by the movement, and therefore no one has the right to dissolve them. Indeed, the decision stood, and after that we heard Mohammed Rashid Khaled Salam on

satellite channels praising the Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades, the martyrs of the Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades, the operations of the Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades, and the heroes of the Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades. Khaled Islam, who was against the Brigades and called for their dissolution, began to praise these Brigades... I believe that the Fatah movement has gone through important milestones and launches, and the third launch of this movement was during the Al-Aqsa Intifada when the first launch was in 1965 and the second in 1967 after the Battle of Karamah... This third launch after Oslo, which put the Fatah movement in a very great confusion before the question: Where are we heading? Until the Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades came and was able to prove its presence in the Palestinian arena, and restored respect and attention to the Fatah movement and its leadership and command of the Palestinian street.

Once again, I want to ask about the state of disunity you experienced in the Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades, as members of the Fatah movement. On the one hand, you carried out controversial operations, on the other hand, you were required to persuade the factions to cease these operations and submit a written pledge, and on the third hand, you thwarted the [Palestinian] Authority's attempts to arrest wanted persons inside the camp... To what extent were you able to coexist with these contradictions, and were you also able to play the role of unifying the forces?

I will begin my answer from the logic of the Zionist enemy, which attributes its invasion of the camp to the existence of national unity and the overlap between the central forces inside the camp, to the point that they did not investigate the militants to which organization they belong... The second matter through which I will answer your question is the statements of the Palestinian opposition in Islamic Jihad and the Popular Front, whether through direct conversations with us or the messages they sent us, or their talk on satellite channels, the last of which was brother Khaled Meshaal, who specifically mentioned my name and spoke about my major role in national unity inside the camp, along with the rest of the youth, specifically as a Fatah movement. This is of course different from our being in the Brigades, as we formed the "middle zone" for the organizations, i.e. the mediator between them, and we searched for the best solutions between the positions of the factions, and we were always the arbitrator in the problems and disagreements between the organizations, especially between Hamas and Islamic Jihad, in our confrontations with the Palestinian Authority when militants were arrested. We always told the organizations to stay aside, and we, as the Fatah movement, will confront this issue so that they do not consider the resistance in the Jenin Camp as if it were at the behest of Iran, Syria, or others. On the contrary, the Fatah movement within the camp is the leading movement within it, and it will protect the fighters and mujahideen inside Jenin Camp. That is why we considered the arrest of any fighter an attack on all of us inside the camp. That is why the largest number of fugitives were inside the camp, and no one was able to enter it and arrest the fighters... There was one attempt to arrest, on the orders of Haidar Rashid, one of the young men of Islamic Jihad. They were accused of sending a martyr during a difficult political situation. It turned out that the martyr "Istiti" had no connection to [Islamic] Jihad,

neither closely nor remotely. Some elements of the [Palestinian] Authority tried to start a major confrontation with Islamic Jihad to drag the camp into a battle to eliminate the resistance within it. This attempt was led by a senior official in the governorate. This attempt failed, and two of our brothers were wounded. One of them was paralyzed from the waist down and is now disabled. He remains a stain of shame on the face of this official and others like him. This young man is now in Abu Raya Hospital in Ramallah, while the second young man is in detention. We captured masked police officers from the security forces who came to arrest us. We later released them after we foiled the arrest and attempted derailment of the situation. We were also responsible for guarding and securing some of our brothers inside the camp.

Returning to the siege and battles in the camp... What logic did you use and distribute your forces within the camp? Was there a hierarchical leadership and military structure?

To be honest, the operation in the camp was not conducted in a 100% military manner. There was an operations room run by Abu Al-Jandal. He even hung a picture of Abu Ammar, the Palestinian flag, and pictures of martyrs from all factions in the room, which served as his office. The young fighters were in the same house. Abu Al-Jandal distributed groups of fighters, and in each group there were two or three members of the National Security to benefit from their combat experience. The distribution was in a semi-circle around the camp. Of course, harmony was taken into account when distributing them into groups. Brother Ziad Al-Amer was present with his group in a very dangerous area, Al-Jabariyat. Another group was present in Jouret Al-Dhahab, and a third group was in the western region. I, Atta Abu Rumaila, Bassam Al-Ragheb, and Ibrahim Jabr were present, and our work was more political than military. My role and the role of the young fighters was to contact Abu Al-Jandal to provide supplies of ammunition and fighters. Our contact later was via the MERS network and mobile phones.

Who was issuing orders and decisions to the groups, for example, regarding withdrawal from a location or carrying out a certain action? Was it Abu Al-Jandal as the operations commander, or were the factions intervening?

I told you from the beginning that the factions were almost abolished, but the decisions were made by the group itself on the ground, provided that it informed us of its decision. However, the central decisions were made by Abu Al-Jandal, except that at one stage, contact with him was cut off due to the lack of batteries, which made each group decide on its own.

Tell us about the martyrdom of Abu Al-Jandal. There is more than one account of the circumstances of his martyrdom. Which is the true account?

The true account, which has been repeated from more than one source, is that we had surrendered ourselves on April 11, 2002, while he was martyred six or seven hours after

our capture. There was a group with him, I remember Abdel Haleem Izz Al-Din among them, and he is still alive. The story goes that he tried to cross the main street in the camp to move to the square area, and he was alone at the time and refused to surrender himself. The moment he appeared on a mound of rubble, they shot him, but it wounded him without killing him. The soldiers approached him and asked him, "Who are you?" He said, "Abu Mohammad." This is according to the story of an old woman who was present at the site, whose name was Umm Ali Awis, and who witnessed the event. Other officers came and recognized him as Abu Al-Jandal, so they shot him directly in the face. It is also said that they took pictures of him while his hands were tied.

You say that Umm Ali Awis saw him injured, and then they shot him. Where was he wounded?

Yes, that's what Umm Ali saw. She said he was shot in the leg, and then they shot him twice in the face. She saw the soldiers shooting.

And the young man who was with Abu Al-Jandal?

I don't think anyone was with him at that moment... "The hyena" who had surrendered himself with Abu Al-Jandal's group, had told me days later in prison that no one was left with Abu Al-Jandal, and I know absolutely nothing about the young man the brothers are talking about being with him.

Tell us about your last hour before you and the group that was with you surrendered.

We were in the eastern part of the camp, me and a large group of fighters, including Alaa Al-Sabbagh, Zakaria Al-Zubeidi, Nidal Al-Turkman, Ali Kaniri, Saeed Tubasi, Thaer Abu Al-Basem, Alaa Freihat, Wael Abu Al-Sabaa, Mohammad Al-Nursi, a young man called Al-Tita, and Mohammad Tawalbeh, the brother of the martyr Mahmoud Tawalbeh. We decided to divide ourselves into two groups, so I moved with a group from the eastern region to the western region in the Al-Hawashin neighborhood, and I was surprised by Hajj Ali Al-Safouri and the group that was with him, so we met up and became 27 fighters. In the afternoon, young men from outside, that is, outside the camp and the siege, contacted us. This was on April 10, 2002. But before that, I want to tell you the sequence of the last hours of the events. We began to move from house to house, while the bulldozers were demolishing and chasing us. Sheikh Riyadh Bdeir, a resident of Tulkarem, had separated from us. He was buried by the bulldozers after he decided to stay and be martyred in the camp. I remember that he told me that his age was 57 years old. Days later, he spoke to his wife on the mobile phone and jokingly said to her, "You still haven't become a widow, Umm Sayyid Qutb," as his son was called. Anyway, we kept moving until we reached the place where we were besieged. The army discovered we were there and we were besieged from all sides, snipers, Apaches, and reconnaissance aircraft all around us. We didn't discuss surrendering ourselves during

this time, and we were still looking for a way out of this siege and to reach another area. Anyway, while we were moving, our brother Ali Abu Al-Saba' was injured, and the young men held his hand and found him martyred. The young men began to cry over him, until I shouted loudly that there was no room for tears and crying now, we had to continue. We discussed among ourselves and looked for a means of communication, but we didn't find one, but I remembered that I had a "Mercedes" that Hajj Imad had given me after he lost his arm. I first called the Secretary of the Fatah Movement, Qadura Musa and Ghassan Al-Saadi, whose numbers I had memorized. They informed me that the group we had left behind in the eastern region had surrendered: Alaa Al-Sabbagh, Nidal Al-Turkman, and others. In general, there was great hesitation and embarrassment to discuss the issue of surrendering ourselves. I remember that I discussed the issue of surrender with Kamal Al-Sabbagh from Hamas and Mohammad Al-Nursi, may Allah have mercy on him. Hajj Ali, who refused to talk about this subject, Kamal Al-Sabbagh said to me, "Why, Jamal, should we kill all 27 of them when there is nothing noteworthy against us that would lead to a long prison sentence?" Consequently, the young men surrendered themselves in the eastern region, and only we remained. So I brought up the issue of surrender, but Hajj Ali spoke to me angrily, saying that he did not want to surrender himself, and a second brother spoke in the same tone. However, Mohammad Al-Nursi was very upset by their talk and considered it an exaggeration, so he and a group of brothers left us. After a few minutes, the brothers returned without Mohammad Al-Nursi and said that he was martyred.

The important thing is that I started contacting after we were sure that our situation was dangerous. The first contact I made was with a brother from Umm Al-Fahm named Ruslan Muhajna from the B'Tselem organization (7). After that, a person named Qassem, an employee at the American consulate in Al-Quds, spoke to me. He said that they had spoken with the Americans and coordinated the situation through the military attaché at the embassy, who spoke with the Israelis to stop the operation and approach us. Indeed, the army's activity around us was stopped. After that, I spoke with Al-Jazeera... Al-Jazeera station. I explained the delicate situation we were in, and to those who contacted me from the Abu Dhabi station. I explained the situation to them and to other stations, which I don't remember all of them. After that, Jibril Rajoub spoke with us and I explained the situation to him. Amin Al-Hindi, the director of general intelligence, spoke with me after that, and brother Faisal Abu Sharkh also spoke with me. I explained the situation to everyone and they confirmed to us that there were promises to stop the operations and for the army to advance. Then, brother Saeb Erekat spoke with me and said that they had spoken with Solana and Zinni to stop the military operations of the Israeli army, but he said that he could not guarantee our lives because the Israelis could not be trusted. Then the official spokesman of the Israeli army spoke to me and said to me, "Brother Jamal, I ask you to surrender yourself and the group with you." A discussion took place between me and him about Hezbollah's initiative to replace us. He said, "This will not happen, and if you do not surrender

7 - B'Tselem, a human rights organization affiliated with the Meretz movement.

yourselves within a certain period of time, we will demolish the entire place on top of you."

After that, we were discussing with him to gain time about the issue of removing our clothes upon surrender. The Israeli campaign commander spoke to me and said to me, "Brother Jamal, I am Captain Alon, and you must surrender after removing your clothes." I told him, "There is no way at all for us to take off our clothes, and we will go out in them, and do with us whatever you want." Indeed, I climbed to the top of the hill and jumped down, and a young man from the group named "Al-Zabour" began speaking to them in Hebrew. We advanced towards the army and without raising our hands, we just raised our shirts to the top and advanced in a column. Captain Alon began calling out, "Where is Jamal Huwail?" I told him, "I am Jamal." He said sarcastically, "Are you Jamal? The thought of you being bigger and greater than you actually are..." He made a gesture with his hand as a greeting, saluted me, took my arm, walked with me forward and said to me while taking me alone... "Brother Jamal, if I were in Sharon's place, I wouldn't have done all of this... I would like us to live with you in peace and I am sure that the day will come when we sit together at one negotiating table to reach a two-state solution for two peoples..." I told him that you did not achieve victory, and if you were really fighters, you wouldn't have done what you did in the camp in terms of demolition and destruction... He showed me some kindness in his behavior and later the young men considered the salute he gave to me and the young men with me as a military salute... In general, he allowed me to look at the destruction in the camp and I contemplated with bitterness the piles of rubble... After that, we were led in a column to the personnel carrier while they filmed us and took us to the mosque. There, Hajj Ali, Iyad Al-Salfiti, and I were called and beaten with rifles in a very brutal manner. Then we were transferred to Salem Camp, and after hours we were in the Jalameh investigation department near the city of Haifa, and this was the beginning of the detention journey.

Testimony of Yahya Mohammad Abdelrahman Al-Zubeidi

I am Yahya Mohammad Abdelrahman Al-Zubeidi, a resident of Jenin Camp. I completed high school and joined the General Intelligence Service under the command of Tawfiq Al-Tirawi. I worked within this service for three years. In addition, I worked for a period as a construction worker. My marital status is single. I was previously arrested once for a month and released on bail. This is my second arrest.

There is conflict between your work in intelligence and your affiliation with one of the resistance military agencies. How were you able to overcome this conflict?

In the Palestinian Authority areas in general, and from my experience with the security apparatus, anyone working within the military frameworks, specifically those affiliated with the opposition forces, is monitored. I worked in this apparatus to protect our movement as a resistance and to protect our weapons from confiscation. I did work in intelligence, but my allegiance was to the Islamic Jihad movement. I was never affiliated with intelligence. Therefore, I can say that we worked in the military apparatus of Islamic Jihad in secret, and apparently everyone knew that I worked in intelligence, which protected me and others from arrest by the [Palestinian] Authority. This arrangement was made with [Islamic] Jihad during the secret meetings that we held.

Didn't the intelligence check on your movements and relationships?

Indeed, I was visited more than once and asked questions like "Why are you with Mahmoud Tawalbeh?" Or Hajj Ali, Thabet Al-Mardawi, and others. This information was coming to them through reports submitted by people, and I maintained my denial of any accusation and always stressed that I was speaking with the people I was asked about due to my friendship with them since my time as a student, and I refused any request they made of me, such as monitoring certain people, or participating in the arrest of freedom fighters... I always refused that.

Before the recent siege, there was information about an Israeli invasion, and many spoke of factional coordination and preparation for this siege. How did this coordination manifest itself in general? Was it at the camp level only, or was there broader coordination beyond those present in the camp? And how did you prepare yourselves for the siege?

We heard that there was news of an invasion of the camp, and in light of this news, all the resistance fighters from different frameworks met at the camp level and began to coordinate and prepare together in order to repel and confront this invasion. They

began to distribute and work according to need and not according to any organizational considerations, meaning the fighters were distributed on the axes according to need and necessity, taking into account the desire of the fighters who felt that they knew the area they chose better than other areas. Our plan for the confrontation was to distribute initially on all the axes of the camp and to preserve the Al-Hawashin neighborhood, which we estimated would eventually be a graveyard for us and them. Al-Hawashin neighborhood was one of the smallest neighborhoods in the camp, and therefore the fighters would gather there. All forces began to put their capabilities in place, such as explosive devices, weapons, funding, etc.

How did the division you talked about actually happen?

First, the armed youth are inside the camp, in addition to the resistance fighters who fled their work at the [Palestinian] Authority's checkpoints and came to the camp, and a number of others from outside the camp... I remember here an elderly resistance fighter from the Tulkarem area who came to the camp and said that he wanted to participate in the defense, and he was martyred... As I told you, the division was based on need and harmony between each group consisting of five individuals, and it was agreed that Abu Al-Jandal would be the military commander of this operation. I emphasize that the division was not based on factions, and I remember that we, through Al-Jazeera, announced the dissolution of the factions inside the camp, and that everyone is now a fighter to defend the honor of this nation.

Was there a leader for each group?

No, the groups were divided into five groups on the axes and houses, without any leader for them. The one who carried the phone was the one who answered Abu Al-Jandal's calls, or called him and informed him of the need for fighters, for example.

Were there any martyrdom-seekers (resistance fighters with explosive belts) inside the camp during the siege?

Yes, there were martyrdom-seekers (resistance fighters with explosive belts), some of them had [explosive] belts wrapped around their waists, but no one knows exactly what happened. Some of them were arrested, others couldn't detonate their belts because they were among the residents, and some tried to detonate themselves but didn't succeed. That's why none of the martyrdom-seekers (resistance fighters with explosive belts) were able to detonate themselves. Mahmoud Tawalbeh was also carrying a[n explosive] belt, but he didn't detonate it because the soldiers couldn't reach him on foot.

When faction officials met, what decision-making mechanism did they use to resolve a particular issue?

Any fighter would suggest a specific proposal, and if it was unanimously agreed upon, it would be implemented. The fall of the martyrs affected us all, especially certain fighters who had an impact and a role in unifying opinion...

Like who?

Like Ziad Amer, who had an impact on our spirits, his martyrdom also boosted the morale and spirits of the youth, to the point that some youth wanted to leave the camp, but after Ziad's martyrdom they decided to stay and continue the resistance.

Who is Ziad Amer?

He is one of the most beloved activists of the Al-Aqsa Brigades among the fighters. Ziad participated in the First Intifada and was imprisoned for seven years. Once released, he returned to the resistance, never compromising on the rights of his people. During the invasion and before his martyrdom, he had a strong presence and played a major role in raising the morale of the fighters.

Did you have enough ammunition and weapons during the invasion?

Yes, there was ammunition and light weapons such as Kalashnikov rifles, M16s, and others.

How did the residents deal with the fighters, especially since you were demolishing the walls of houses to pass through the gaps?

There was a positive response from the vast majority of the residents. We would enter any house and open a breach. There was a general feeling among everyone that the army would not enter the camp except in one case: to demolish the camp, and that is what happened.

Are there any examples of families who have helped?

The closest example is my family, for example. Our house is located in a high area, so we moved my family to my uncle's house next to our house, and the house became a residence and a monitoring base for the fighters. The same thing happened in the Al-Damj neighborhood, as the entire neighborhood provided assistance and support to the fighters, even the women and girls of the neighborhood participated in monitoring the fighters. This neighborhood emerged as the neighborhood that was most involved and provided the most assistance, to the point that the people of the neighborhood participated in opening holes in the walls of their homes so that the fighters could move around.

The Israelis claimed that you forced civilians to stay inside the camp so that you could find protection with them. What do you think of that?

First of all, we did not force anyone to stay. Rather, the position was taken by the residents themselves. At the beginning of the siege, no more than 100 elderly people and children left the camp. Every person with dignity and a shred of patriotism held on to their homes and lands and refused to leave at the time.

When did the people start leaving?

On approximately the fifth or sixth day, residents began to leave the areas controlled by the army. The army arrested the wounded and transported children and young people to the city of Jenin and the surrounding villages. They had tried to call on the residents to leave from the beginning of the invasion, but their call was met with refusal.

Would you like to mention any martyred fighters who have made achievements that you would like to mention?

Yes, I remember Nidal Al-Nubani, a son of Jenin Camp, who was known to be a fierce fighter. He was martyred along with his brother and two other brothers, Amjad Al-Fayed and Mohammed Al-Fayed. Nidal was working in the Preventive Security, and before the invasion, he asked them for a weapon, so they provided him with a defective and poorly functioning Kalashnikov. This action affected him greatly, considering that they (the [Palestinian] Authority) had taken the weapon to areas outside the city. Nidal was martyred on the ninth day of the invasion. A belt of bullets belonging to the army was found with him, which he had managed to seize, as well as medals (8) for the occupation soldiers he had killed in the clash. I heard from the fighters how he threw away the defective Kalashnikov, and I later saw him ask this or that fighter for his weapon to use and fire from it at the Israeli army and return it to its owner, until he was able to obtain a rifle of his own.

Tell us about the martyr Nasr Jarrar and his first injury.

His first injury was about a year ago, on Qabatiya Street while we were trying to plant explosive devices on the bypass road. We had extended the wires of two devices, and Nasr went to connect the wire to the first and second devices. Apparently, there was a defect. I believe there was an electrical charge in the wire, and as soon as he connected it, the first and second devices exploded, directed towards the position where Nasser was standing. The four of us were injured by the explosion, and I and another fighter ran towards the car. We thought Nasr was martyred, so we agreed to go to the hospital and send a group to retrieve Nasr's body. We set off, but the driver of the car was unable to drive as he was temporarily blinded by the explosion. We found someone else who took us to the hospital, and we informed the young men about Nasr. They went to retrieve his body and found that he was not martyred, but his hand and leg were severely injured and were later amputated. He succeeded in hiding his pistol

8 - It refers to the dog tags that soldiers carry, with their numbers on them.

under his head after burying it in the dirt. They found him reciting verses from the Holy Qur'an, fully conscious, to the point that he refused to be carried in their hands. He remembered that there was a zinc plate nearby, and asked the young men to bring it and place him on it so they could carry it. When he arrived at the hospital, he spoke with the doctors and asked them not to treat one of his legs but to start treating the other, because he felt the first was fine and healthy despite the injury. His morale was very high, and he would joke about the injury and encourage the young men around him. Before the last invasion, they amputated his other leg after he was convinced it was of no use to him. When the last invasion began, he came to the camp, which greatly contributed to raising the morale of the fighters. They pressured him to leave the camp, where he wanted to stay to participate in the fighting. He was convinced to stay on the outskirts of the camp to maintain contact with us. Later, as you know, he was martyred in Tubas after the Israeli army demolished the house on top of him.

What about the role of women and cubs?

Women in the camp played a very important role, focusing on supplying the fighters with food, medicine, and water, as well as monitoring the army's movements. As for the cubs, they also played a role. They excelled in throwing the explosive devices they carried in their school bags. A cub I remember, named Abdel Kareem Al-Saadi, was martyred. He insisted more than once to blow himself up. I also remember the cub Shadi Al-Nubani, who always asked us to provide him with an explosive device or a weapon, or to carry out a martyrdom operation. We refused more than once. I remember one time when we were at their house, my brother and I, and we had a rifle with us. He asked to see it and take it for a tour of the camp. He never returned, and we later found him with the fighters.

What do you attribute the presence of such a large and widespread phenomenon of martyrdom-seekers (resistance fighters with explosive belts) in Jenin Camp to?

Firstly, I attribute it to faith in Allah Almighty, and secondly, the youth's desire for revenge. There are more than a hundred martyrdom-seekers (resistance fighters with explosive belts) in the camp, some of whom had friends or brothers who wanted to take revenge and who wanted to fight and become martyrdom-seekers (resistance fighters with explosive belts).

In other areas there are religious people, so why Jenin and Jenin Camp in particular?

I don't know... Their faith increased... There are people who are not good at shooting, for example, and they wanted to carry out an operation, so they carried out martyrdom operations. I affirm that no one was martyred out of hatred for life, but rather to avenge the martyrs and out of faith in Allah Almighty. Also, the martyr in this Intifada is not like the martyr in the era of Yahya Ayyash before, when the young man was

convinced and ideologically mobilized. In this Intifada, there is no need for that. There is no need for someone who understands religious matters. You just need someone to deliver you an explosive device. That is why you find everyone recruiting and going down as martyrdom-seekers (resistance fighters with explosive belts).

You say that the martyrdom-seekers (resistance fighters with explosive belts) want to take revenge, but why are most of them young?

The majority of the wanted men were in Jenin Camp, where there was an agreement with the [Palestinian] Authorities that no wanted men would be arrested from inside the camp, and this, I believe, had a significant impact on the phenomenon of martyrdom in this camp. In general, I attribute this phenomenon primarily to the faith and great enthusiasm of the youth for martyrdom, especially when they see the martyrs. I tell you that during our visits to the mourning houses recently, we did not go to offer our condolences. Rather, it was very common and normal to say to the family of the martyr, "Congratulations, and may the rest [of us] be granted the same [fate]." Believe me, there were young boys who came and cried bitterly, asking for an explosive belt, wanting martyrdom. Look now at the number of martyrdom-seekers (resistance fighters with explosive belts) who were arrested and are with us in prison.

Are you aware of any contacts made with you to leave the camp and avoid exposing it to invasion and destruction?

I remember that Ahmed Abdel Rahman contacted Jamal Huwail and asked him to get the wanted men out of the camp and hide them until this phase passed. Only three left, and they had no impact, but those who left were martyred before those who stayed. In fact, we survived despite the siege. For example, Hamas got Qais Adwan out of the camp so he could continue the struggle and avenge the martyrs, but he was martyred before them. The [Palestinian] Authorities focused on calling for people to leave, and there were some young men who called on the youth from inside the camp to leave, but the fighters made up their mind between victory or martyrdom.

Have you been in contact with sites experiencing invasions in other areas?

Yes, we were in contact with Ramallah, Tulkarem, and Nablus, and the fighters tried to transfer our experience from previous invasions to these areas. However, the fall of Ramallah without resistance affected us all, especially when we saw the weapons that were found. In the camp, we were ready in most aspects, even electricity. We brought two motors to the camp and large loudspeakers that were installed on the roofs of the houses. They were an important factor in raising morale, as the young men talked through them with everyone, remembered the martyrs, and chanted "Allahu Akbar." I remember how they broadcast over the loudspeakers about a girl who blew herself up with the army in the Al-Damj neighborhood. These things had a positive impact on morale. Later, it turned out that there was no girl, but rather an ambush set up by the young men for an Israeli infantry force.

What most impacted your morale?

During the last period of the siege, there was talk about the army starting to withdraw, or commemorating the martyrs. I remember here that one of the young men took hold of a loudspeaker and began speaking in Hebrew to the soldiers, saying, "Instructions... Instructions." Then everything stopped, from the shelling and the shooting, and the army thought the voice was from their leadership...

He continued and said to them, "You are in the camp of martyrdom. Do you think you will be able to storm it?" Immediately, shooting began in all directions and the soldiers went insane. They tried to reach the loudspeakers but were unable to do so.

Where were you in the camp during the siege?

In Al-Hawashin neighborhood, in the last few days I was in a house on the outskirts of Al-Hawashin neighborhood in Al-Nubani's house. We gathered there and the army started bombing. They bombed the house, so we gathered, some of us in the bathroom and some in the corner of one of the rooms. When they burned the second floor of the house, they took the family out and we left after them.

Didn't you try to inform the army that there were civilians, including women and children, in the house?

Unfortunately, even if you tried, no one could hear you. The gunfire is so intense and the sound of the plane prevents that.

What day were you arrested? And where?

On the eleventh day, I was arrested with a group of young men. There was an injured woman with us, and the bulldozer was demolishing the house. We thought we were the last group, as we had lost contact with the other groups. This house belonged to Rashad Al-Nursi, so we decided in the afternoon to surrender ourselves. We took the family out first so they wouldn't shoot at us and the house. The family did leave, and we followed them. They separated us from each other. They asked us to take off our clothes and searched us. They even asked us to carry the injured woman on a stretcher with our hands tied, and to remove the hijab from her for fear that she might be booby-trapped. This woman stayed until midnight, and we left her there. I don't know what happened to her, as we were transferred to Salem Camp.

Looking back, do you think staying in the camp was the right decision?

I believe we had to stay in the camp even if it was destroyed. We lost many dear people. I lost my brother Taha Al-Zubeidi, my mother Samira Al-Zubeidi was martyred, and my cousin Nidal Abu Shadouf was martyred. There are many friends, and I see nothing wrong with the resistance operation. We expected them to storm with tanks, planes, and infantry, but we did not expect bulldozers.

How do you see the morale of the Israeli soldier?

In previous invasions, we heard many stories about Israeli soldier's cowardice, and his screaming and wailing. The locals even heard them talking about some of them, saying that such-and-such group had entered a dangerous place and that they would be devoured there (9). In this invasion, the picture was confirmed for me, as some of them did not leave their tanks and did not confront us face to face on the ground.

9 - They will be devoured, in Hebrew it means a disaster will befall them.

Testimony of Abdul Jabbar Khalil Khabas

From Jalqamous, married with one daughter, 25 years old. I only finished tenth grade. I belong to the Izz Ad-Din Al-Qassam Brigades. Until the moment of my arrest, I worked in the National Security Service for six years with the rank of corporal.

First, I will talk about the preparations before the last invasion of the camp. There was continuous field work carried out by both the political and military levels in the camp. There was enthusiasm among all the resistance fighters since the invasion of Ramallah and the beginning of preparing ourselves. IEDs were planted at the entrances to the camp, and a campaign to boost morale among fighters and residents began.

You're talking about the last invasion?

Yes, and that was on March 31, 2002, and we, 27 soldiers from the National Security Forces, participated in the resistance and defense of the camp, led by the martyr Abu Al-Jandal, as we came with him to the camp, and Abu Al-Jandal was the one who distributed the resistance fighters on the axes, and this was due to his military capabilities.

What was the military rank of Abu Al-Jandal?

He was a First Lieutenant, and as I told you, he led the process of distributing fighters. The various leaderships of the military cadres would contact Abu Al-Jandal to consult with him on matters of work and equipment.

Does this mean that Abu Al-Jandal deployed you not as National Security personnel but as fighters, since, as you said, he was in contact with the leaders of the existing forces?

Yes, and he distributed us on most of the axes, where you would find 3-5 soldiers in each location, and we were supported with ammunition and other things by the national and Islamic forces. After the invasion of Ramallah began, the process of planting explosive devices at various entrances to the camp began, where some of these devices were anti-personnel and others were anti-tank. Focus was placed on monitoring all the devices, and indeed the Israeli Occupation Forces besieged Jenin and the camp. They intervened and concentrated in the Al-Jabariyat area, Hosh Al-Saada, and Nablus Street. On March 31, 2002, at half past two in the morning, they began their attempt to storm the camp. The resistance was prepared for this, and thus the resistance began...

Where did they try to get in first?

On the first night, special forces tried to infiltrate from the Al-Jabriyat area into the camp. They were discovered and a group detonated explosive devices against the force and opened fire on it. There were deaths and wounded among the ranks of the Israeli special forces that tried to infiltrate.

Do you remember which fighters were in this ambush?

I remember that a fighter named Imad Abu Al-Fadl (martyred) was among those who participated in the ambush. The resistance fighters seized several medium machine guns, including a Negev machine gun. After this clash, the tanks advanced towards the camp from Harsh Al-Saada and from Wadi Burqin. As they advanced towards the outskirts of the camp, explosive devices were detonated against the tanks. There was very fierce resistance, which forced them to retreat. The clash continued until 3:00 PM the following day, and the Israeli forces were unable to control any point on the outskirts of the camp. After that, they were able to control a point under Al-Jabariyat, which is a point overlooking the camp. This point provided cover for the army, as it was able to concentrate in other points on the outskirts of the camp. This was on approximately the fourth day. The siege continued and was also interspersed with shelling by tank shells and heavy machine guns in an attempt to break the resistance, exhaust the fighters, and force them to surrender. This situation continued for two days, during which the fighters were able to monitor the army positions during the day and began their attacks on these positions during the night, as the resistance fighters were unable to reach these areas during the day. They were able to storm several positions where the army was concentrated and were able to kill a number of soldiers in these positions.

On the fourth day, when they discovered the size of the resistance and their inability to advance, an Apache helicopter arrived and began firing heavily and randomly, which led to a state of bewilderment among the resistance fighters. During this, infantry forces began advancing towards other buildings to control them in the camp. During this, Ashraf Abu Al-Haija, Tariq Darawsheh, Ziad Amer, and others were martyred. The army used planes that began bombing with missiles during the night, as the army's plan was to bomb with tanks and planes from 7 PM until 5 AM without stopping, so as to exhaust us without sleep. They were also launching mortar rockets from the Al-Jabriyat area, and at dawn they began advancing to control other points inside the camp. On the fifth day, the fighters withdrew from Al-Tawalbeh neighborhood to the Al-Hawashin and Al-Damj neighborhoods. The army was unable to advance to the square area until the fifth day. When the tanks began to advance, explosive devices exploded in their direction, forcing them to bring in large (D9) bulldozers. They used small bulldozers until the fifth day, and the explosive devices disabled the tanks and small bulldozers and caused them severe damage.

On the fifth day, when they brought in the large bulldozers, the latter began removing the dirt barriers in the streets. The western neighborhood was occupied by the army under heavy air cover, as planes bombed the streets and fired everywhere. The demolition of houses began on the sixth day, with bulldozers demolishing houses and paving new roads. The bulldozers demolished entire neighborhoods, but left one or two houses standing so that snipers could watch the roads and small entrances to the neighborhoods. They fired at anything that moved. Many young men were martyred while trying to move from one street to another and from one alley to another, but the snipers were spotting everything.

On the seventh day, the infantry advanced towards the Al-Hawashin and Al-Damj neighborhoods, but they were unable to storm these neighborhoods, as the resistance was fierce. The fighters adopted the idea of moving from one house to another through breaches in the walls until they could reach the army. I remember that the martyr Abu Al-Jandal was trying to open a breach in one of the walls, and at the same time, in the same house, the soldiers were trying to create a breach opposite of it. Abu Al-Jandal was able to sneak into the house after opening a breach in the wall before the soldiers and opened fire on them. I remember what happened on the sixth day, when the martyrs Mahmoud Tawalbeh, Mahmoud Abu Hilweh, and Shadi Ighbariya ambushed the army in Al-Damj neighborhood, where they killed several soldiers and seized their weapons. This incident took place at the beginning of the night, on the same night that the army surrounded the area where the three young men were located, identified the house they were in, and bombed it until they were martyred.

During this period, the army tried to storm the neighborhoods with infantry. Battles took place inside the houses, face to face, during the day, as aircraft could not bomb them due to the presence of their soldiers on the ground, a few meters away. The resistance fighters took advantage of this opportunity. During that time, the army was able to divide the camp into sections by opening the streets after demolishing the buildings, and keeping snipers controlling them and spreading death. Tanks began to advance behind the bulldozers after the western neighborhood was separated from the eastern neighborhood on the fifth and sixth days, and the neighborhoods themselves were also separated. On the sixth day, civilians began to surrender after they were tightly surrounded, with no way out. On the seventh day, the army pressured the resistance and the battles intensified, reaching their peak on this special day. This was after the Israelis estimated that the majority of the resistance fighters had surrendered.

Approximately how many surrendered?

About twenty fighters, as some groups were surrounded and lost the ability to communicate, so they had no choice but to surrender. The most intense days of fighting were the seventh, eighth, and ninth days, when, as I said, the infantry soldiers entered and the fighting became direct. The air force could only intervene in specific cases, bombing when the army was far away during the day. At night, the soldiers would withdraw, and aircraft would resume bombing throughout the night. These three days

were difficult and intense, as bulldozers were carrying out demolition, and when the bulldozers began demolishing in places we hadn't expected and that posed a direct threat, the resistance fighters tried to disrupt them by planting explosive devices, but to no avail. This had no effect. On the ninth day, the resistance weakened, and the sound of gunfire or explosive devices could no longer be heard from the resistance fighters. There was only the sound of army shelling, as the fighters could no longer move easily after the demolition they had carried out and the snipers deployed. It seems that during this time, the army appeared to have completely annihilated the resistance, and began advancing with its infantry soldiers into the neighborhoods, with each group comprising 20-25 soldiers.

On the tenth day, two groups ambushed the army in the Al-Damj neighborhood. At about 3:30 AM, a group of soldiers entered between the two ambushes. At that point, the resistance fighters began shooting, detonating explosive devices, and throwing hand grenades at the soldiers, killing 13 soldiers and wounding others. Three fighters were martyred, and the army withdrew from the ground. Aircraft began heavy bombardment again, forcing the resistance fighters to withdraw. After that, we no longer saw any infantry advancing. The bombardment continued until 4:00 PM, after which the army began advancing. It was able to separate some resistance groups from each other, and some groups surrendered after being surrounded.

How many have surrendered at this point?

Two groups surrendered, the first numbered about 20, and the second about 15 fighters. During that time, only the resistance fighters remained in the camp. On the eleventh day, we were 28 resistance fighters, trying to find gaps so that we could move from one area to another, but we could not. We tried the first time and did not succeed, and a young man named Wael Abu Al-Sabaa was wounded with us. At first, we were two groups. After Wael was injured, the two groups joined together in another attempt. Mohammad Al-Nursi was martyred and Al-Zabour was injured. We realized that we would not be able to move and proceed from the area in which we were besieged. The army discovered our location and determined it completely, while we did not see the soldiers, as we were inside the buildings. This situation continued until ten o'clock in the evening, and then the bulldozers began to surround us. They finally besieged us in three houses. We numbered 28, and Hajj Riyad was martyred, so we became 27. We were still looking for a way through which we could get out and reach the western neighborhood. None of us had the intention of surrendering before that day. During that time, the fighters present began discussion about the option of surrender, we were accompanied by Hajj Ali Al-Safouri, Jamal Huwail, Thabet Al-Mardawi, Omar Al-Sharif, Freihat, and Mahdi Bishnak. There was a majority in favor of surrender, based on the fact that there was no room for resistance with bulldozers because it was useless. At that point, Jamal Huwail began to make contact. He contacted Hisham Al-Rakh, a captain in the Preventive Security, who was present with Rajoub and spoke with him. He told him that our situation was difficult and that we wanted to surrender. Jamal Huwail spoke with Jibril Rajoub, and the latter told him that he would coordinate for

that. Jamal asked for a ceasefire and demolition [to be stopped]. Indeed, the ceasefire and demolition stopped, and Apache helicopters and planes arrived at the site and began to fire flare signals, along with a plane. During that, Rajoub was speaking with Jamal Huwail and told him that coordination was continuing. The latter asked for the surrender to take place in the presence of a third party, American or otherwise. During the talks, the official in charge of the Israeli military campaign spoke directly with Jamal and asked him to surrender. These contacts continued for several hours, from ten in the evening until six in the morning, while we were stalling and talking about the necessity of a third party. In the morning, the campaign official spoke through loudspeakers and asked that we surrender ourselves, and indeed we began to surrender ourselves unarmed and they tied us up and put us in the mosque area and then they transferred us to Salem Camp. I would like to point out that Sheikh Riyadh (Abu Imad) refused to surrender himself with us and moved to another building. He said that he did not want to surrender himself and remained alone and his moving to the adjacent building was a refusal even to participate in the discussion. I heard later that he was buried alive under the rubble of the building that they demolished on him.

There was talk of an agreement between you and the army when you surrendered that you would leave without taking off your clothes or raising your hands. Did that happen?

We went out and surrendered ourselves without raising our hands or taking off our clothes as agreed upon, but when we reached the soldiers they asked us to take off our shirts and Jamal talked to the campaign official about that and we subsequently took off our shirts. Regarding raising our hands, the campaign official asked us to raise our hands and argued that it was in our best interest, as a soldier might shoot one of us.

You said that the demolition of homes actually began on the fifth day. Were residents inside the homes?

Yes, the bulldozers advanced and started demolishing the houses while the residents were inside. This happened in the Al-Hawashin and Al-Damj neighborhoods and above Al-Mustashfa [street]. People were leaving their homes and surrendering themselves when they saw the bulldozer advancing toward their homes. The residents began surrendering themselves on the seventh and eighth day and the houses were demolished.

The Israeli narrative says that you told civilians not to leave. How true is this narrative?

We didn't tell the civilians about it. We called on the residents to stay to save their homes from being demolished. This happened after the sixth day, when there were empty houses and other houses. We thought they wouldn't demolish the houses on top of the residents, but they did. The residents were inviting us to enter their homes, and

we refused, as they wanted food. This happened to me personally, and I didn't enter for fear that the house would be bombed. Despite that, the army was bombing randomly.

Did the army use civilians as human shields?

I didn't see it, but that doesn't mean they didn't use them. I heard from fighters that they actually used them.

You said that you came to the camp with Abu Al-Jandal. On what basis did you stay in the camp? Was there an order from the authorities to stay?

We had arrived at the camp five days before the last invasion, and were ordered to evacuate our positions. We did so and headed to the camp, which was the best area. Abu Al-Jandal told us that the best place for us to be was in the camp and that we should join the resistance there. Orders were issued by the regional commander, Fayez Arafat, to all agencies that whoever wanted to go home could do so. There were soldiers who had already gone home, but Abu Al-Jandal told us that he would not withdraw from the camp and encouraged us to do so, and we decided to stay to defend the camp. Orders were also issued by the deputy regional commander to surrender our weapons.

Did you witness the call that reached Abu Al-Jandal, ordering him to withdraw?

At first, Abu Al-Jandal was asked to withdraw and hand over the weapons to the Regional [Commander]. He refused. In light of his refusal, they told him not to prevent any of the National Security personnel who were with him and wanted to withdraw from doing so. When the siege began, Abu Al-Jandal asked the operations commander for ammunition. The latter told him that there was no ammunition at the moment, knowing that there had been enough ammunition. They later said that they would send ammunition in due course because there were no signs of an invasion at the moment. The security commanders withdrew from Jenin to the Al-Hashimiya axis. At the same time, National Security soldiers arrived from that area to defend the camp, preferring to disobey the order to remain in Al-Hashimiya.

As you knew and worked with Abu Al-Jandal and were with him during the battles, tell us about him as a leader and as a person...

As for Abu Al-Jandal, he was truly a fighter and enthusiastic about fighting, even before the events. He used to sit with us and talk to us only in the language of fighting and conflict with Israel. He said that this peace would not last and that our conflict would be very long, and he always tried to prepare us morally and psychologically for these battles. During the events of the prisoners' uprising, he was a direct participant in this uprising, as he inflicted three injuries on the Israeli army. Abu Al-Jandal shot the Israeli liaison commander in the D.C.O, whose name was (Tiran), and three other soldiers. As a result, Abu Al-Jandal was suspended from work by a decision from the [Palestinian]

Authority. They even suspended the unit official whose name was Riyad Al-Tarsheh, who was Abu Al-Jandal's deputy. Abu Al-Jandal was transferred from work and sent to Bethlehem. Then, problems arose with him there, and he was arrested by the intelligence service. In the end, he was transferred to Jenin and took over the command of his unit, which was the implementation and reconnaissance unit affiliated with the operations department. He remained in charge of this unit until the events that took place in the Jenin Camp. We always had discussions with him, and he used to tell us about the battles he participated in during his days in Beirut when he was a young boy against the Israeli army. Those he saw as cowardly soldiers... Abu Al-Jandal had absolutely no connection to what was happening in Jenin throughout the Al-Aqsa Intifada. He used to work at the Al-Hashimiya checkpoint, did not interfere in anything, and remained isolated until the political arrests took place in the ranks of Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and the other factions, including the arrest of Hajj Ali Al-Safouri... He always used to tell us, "Even if I tell you not to shoot at the Israelis, do not abide by what I say." He always used to repeat that we should not shoot unless they entered Area A, but he was the first to shoot at the Israelis even before they entered these areas in Jenin. Abu Al-Jandal was very sociable and was with us not because of his rank and because we were soldiers under his command, but as a friend and without the barriers and barricades that military life might impose. However, when he stood to assign us tasks and responsibilities, he acted with authority and seriousness, based on his military rank... And in his free time, you could tell how he was a man with a great sense of humor.

To complete a previous question, please elaborate on the call that took place between an official and Abu Al-Jandal on the eve of the recent invasion.

When it was confirmed that the camp was besieged and the invasion was imminent, one of the officials called Abu Al-Jandal and asked him to withdraw the National Security forces from the camp. He responded that he had been inside the camp for two weeks and was preparing for this confrontation on the side of the resistance, even if we had to fire on the army from a distance. "How do you want me to withdraw the forces from the camp now?" He refused the request. The latter replied that he had ordered him to withdraw. He refused and instead he would present the matter to the fighters, and that whoever wanted to go home should do so after leaving their weapons in the camp. The official replied, "This way I understand that you are refusing the military order." Abu Al-Jandal responded, "Yes, I refuse the military order and I will fight in the camp even if they blow it all up over our heads." He threw the MERS device on the ground. He immediately went around all the axes where he distributed the National Security personnel on the side of the resistance and informed them of the call. He continued visiting the sites while telling the young men about the battles, and that what was coming was not dangerous and would greatly raise their morale. I even joked with him and told him that what happened to the rest of the officers in the other areas would happen to him, "You will throw down your weapon and throw down your military uniform." He would reply, "No matter what, I will not lay down my weapon or my military uniform, and this is impossible." He was very provoked by the sight of the

fighters in Ramallah coming out without their clothes and raising their hands, and when he saw the security personnel inside a room where they were shot at close range and executed... Then, that same night, he began to visit all the locations and tell us, "Whether you fight or not, the Israeli army will kill you, as it did in Ramallah, and you must stand firm and fight." When Abu Al-Jandal narrated and spoke, he had an emotional style that was convincing to the young men and very influential on them, to the point that all the fighters wanted to be with him in the fight, and the fighters of the factions were asking for this, not just the National Security personnel.

Hajj Abu Ali Al-Safouri told us the story of Abu Al-Jandal's martyrdom. He said that they were with him in a house, and when a bulldozer approached to demolish it, they escaped through an opening in the wall. Abu Al-Jandal saved time and left the house, taking the normal route to avoid the danger of the bulldozer. Then, he was wounded and they heard him screaming that he was wounded. Later, he was eliminated. How exactly was Abu Al-Jandal martyred?

I was actually separated from Abu Al-Jandal because of the bombing. On the ninth day, I met him for only five minutes. I was wounded, and he joked that he had abandoned me because of my wound because he wanted healthy fighters. Anyway, on that day, he went alone with a young man named Omar Attian from Anzah. The latter, whom I had met on my first day of detention, told me that they, he and Abu Al-Jandal, were in a house that bulldozers were trying to demolish. Abu Al-Jandal said that he would try to get out and cross the street under the hospital to go to the demolished neighborhood there and take cover by the cliff. When they left, Abu Al-Jandal was in the middle of the street and the young man (Omar) was on a dirt mound. He saw the soldiers, and when he tried to turn back, they shot him in the neck. He managed to warn Omar to come back, but Omar was shot in the side. The soldiers came to the young man, who had remained conscious, and asked him, "Who is this with you?" "Is he Abu Al-Jandal?" He told them his name was Abu Mohammad. They asked the young man to approach Abu Al-Jandal to remove the pouch he was wearing over his chest, as they feared it was an explosive belt. He removed the belt and found that Abu Al-Jandal was alive and not dead. He was moving his leg and hand and was breathing normally. When they left, taking Omar with them, after a short distance, Omar heard four bullets fired. He believes they were the bullets that were fired at Abu Al-Jandal and killed him.